2023年3月27日星期一

地產站Weekly Talk外圍危機削樓市信心?王震宇教路用家、投資者判斷市場方向 20230327

 2023年3月27日


香港經濟日報記者 潘淑盈

王震宇:加息未完+金融危機削市場信心

外圍金融危機浪接浪,Bricks & Mortar Management創辦人兼總裁王震宇認為,這將削弱市場信心,料第二季新盤會繼續低開吸客。

王震宇認為,現時很多人以為樓市、經濟好轉,但忽然銀行板塊出現問題,連科技公司· 如亞馬遜都再裁員9,000名員工,未來一段時間「萬惡以高息、為首」·遂會影響市場信心。不過,幸好中港已經通關,視乎通關效應何時可沖喜樓市。

        同時,經歷過去數十年的減息周期,他預測加息周期不會在數年內完結。即使近期的金融危機會令加息步伐減慢,但數年後可能會再升至6、7厘水平。

        除非有很大的需求,例如如因組織家庭而換樓,否則他不建議投資者現時入市。如有入市的需要,他亦建議買家亦要觀望一段時間才考慮置業,因樓價在去年12月份已經見底,而那是短期的見底,估計短期內中原城市領先指數(CCL)可能再彈升3至4個百分點 其後會出現頗強的阻力,若然屆時沒有上升, 很大機會會向下。

新盤次季續「求量不求價」

        展望第二季,他認為新盤成交量會增加但價錢未有很大的上升動力,而且今年與明年住宅供應量屬於新高,加上發展商已經很久未有賣樓,因此有去貨壓力。在該等因素下·發展商在第二季很大機會續採「求量不求價」的策略推盤。

報導來源:HKET- 地產站Weekly Talk 

特此鳴謝

香港經濟日報記者:潘淑盈

攝影及剪接:樊志恒

文章來源: HKET

請前往作者YouTube頻道觀看更多視頻: 王震宇宇論 Yulun


General Disclaimer - where quoted in media reports, your correspondent does not exercise control on editorial policy and therefore what appears in the publication may not coincide, or even rarely, contradict your correspondent's views... 

2023年3月17日星期五

Which Alternative to USDC now? 20220314

Following the USDC depegging, triggered by custodian bank bankruptcy, it is opportune to re-examine the quality of stable coins on the market (which we do at least 3 times a year as a matter of course), and the results are summarised in today's missive below...


There are many levels of risks attached to stablecoins, and the table below looks at 3 aspects:

a) how often and how reliable are issuers audited - obviously USDC has the most prestigious auditor in the form of Deloitte, followed by BDO which issues reports on assets for USDT. This is cold comfort however when SVB itself is audited by KPMG, another big-4 firm...

b) how liquid are the asset backing - here USDC does best with almost all collateral in the most liquid category of assets (cash or short term TBs), followed by USDT (only 18% in longer dated TBs), while DAI is mostly in cryptos (but still 64% being USDC backed);

c) who are the custodian banks - here it is very hard to gauge whether bigger banks are better (more liquidity?) or worse (more complex derivatives books?), but since most of the issuers do not disclose this information (the USDC one only came to light following the SVB crisis), there is no easy way to quantify the counterparty risk at all...

For tradfi supporters, USDC still presents the best protection; for crypto maximalists however, DAI could offer a better solution (but needs to rid itself of tradfi backing to be purist - ie use BTC/ETH as asset collaterals rather than USDC/GUSD and the like).


What about hedging with derivatives?

Aside from avoiding volatility by parking in stablecoins, another way might be to buy put options for downside protection. Below we have done a scenario based on today's prices:

Sadly costs are too steep for hedging under normal circumstances - as can be seen in 3rd column above, for at the money hedging, 12-14% of the portfolio needs to be sold to buy the protection...


So we are back to stablecoins then...

As a result, it seems we are stuck with stablecoins for now, and our hope remain that when BTC becomes big and liquid enough to absorb all hedging activities, perhaps we will have a working decentralised and purely crypto based hedge.

Until that day, here is our updated risk metric table - for now USDT and BUSD seem to be better scoring given the high volatility seen in USDC in the past few days:

When combined by the qualitative factors discussed in the earlier sections, we will stick with USDC for now...

With the crisis now seemingly over, we are seeing all USDC trading pairs on the larger DEX platforms back to normal behaviour, eg:

Here are not small U$120k trade vs WBTC is attracting only a price impact of 0.24% on one of the several side chain pools. Hail decentralisation!

As we commented earlier also, the coincidence of crypto banks being brought down almost simultaneously is raising questions elsewhere as to whether the takedowns were coordinated - see article 1 below for more. In the end, just like centralised banks fail while decentralised crypto networks continue unfazed, perhaps this will be the norm years in the future?


-----------------------------------------------------article 1------------------------------------------------------------
Binance’s CZ Speculates a Coordinated Effort to Shut Down Crypto-Friendly Banks is in Play

Vignesh Karunanidhi | March 11, 2023


...Unfortunately, the banking realm took a hit with the fall of Silvergate Bank. The issues also escalated with the recent downfall of the Silicon Valley bank.

...Changpeng Zhao, aka CZ, recently put out a tweet highlighting the recent shutdown of cryptocurrency-friendly banks:

Pure speculation. It almost feels like there is a coordinated effort to shutdown crypto friendly banks.

Result?

Banks are shut down.

Blockchains still running.

— CZ 🔶 Binance (@cz_binance) March 11, 2023


CZ says crypto-friendly banks are being shut down

CZ speculates that it feels like there’s a coordinated effort to shut down crypto-friendly banks. The tweet is a follow-up to the recent downfall of two of the cryptocurrency-friendly banks, Silvergate and Silicon Valley Bank. These two banks had a significant relationship with some of the most prominent cryptocurrency giants. However, the relationship has taken a toll as the banks are no longer in play to provide their services to these cryptocurrency businesses.

Perhaps CZ also highlighted the result of this speculative shutdown of cryptocurrency-friendly banks. He mentioned in his tweet that the banks might be shut down, but the blockchains are still up and running.

One Twitter user commented on the tweet, stating that it’s time to stay united and that only CZ can lead the cryptocurrency community out of this darkness.

However, CZ mentioned that there is no necessity for leaders in a decentralized ecosystem, and he also stressed the fact that it works better without a leader.​


​https://watcher.guru/news/binances-cz-speculates-a-coordinated-effort-to-shut-down-crypto-friendly-banks-is-in-play

2023年3月16日星期四

USDC depegging crisis - More a Debt/Banking/Liquidity Crisis than a Crypto one 20230313

Given the importance of the subject matter and its ability to impact everyone's financial arrangements in the coming years, we are putting the below internal client communication out in the public domain, hoping to contribute to clarify what actually happened in the liquidity crisis initially couched as a crypto crisis.

----------------------------

The depegging of the USDC stablecoin over the weekend was a big event, as it could have shake the confidence in what is deemed the safest of all the stablecoins. There was quite a roller coaster ride in both USDC and DAI (which holds some USDC as its reserve backing), which now seem to be all good again after govt guarantees were rushed out late Sunday:

USDC touched as low as 0.88 early Saturday

Crypto banks - the Sudden Wipe Out Syndrome?

Whilst it is easy to characterise the incident as another 'nail in the coffin' of cryptos, a look under the hood reveals that this is a banking/liquidity problem - deposit taker (or SVB) going bust and not the stablecoin operator, who has barely jumped ship from another bankrupt bank (i.e. Silvergate Bank) some 10 days ago (see details here)!

What seems odd though is that these close banking allies of the crypto ecosystem seem to be going under eerily close together - Signature Bank also got taken over by the govt (article 1) citing liquidity issues also.

With these entities now killed off in short succession, some in crypto space might question could this be not random occurrences just when govts are starting to launch their own CBDCs (central bank digital currencies)? Without these on/off ramp channels, how could the crypto space continue to grow?

The 4 Hoursemen of debt apocalypse?

Irrespective of what possible coincidences/agenda against the crypto industry may be speculated, what we see in the bigger picture is that we are in the early phase of a bond default crisis that has been decades in the making:

a) ever lower record low interest rates has created bias for buying and holding 'risk free' govt bonds (sometimes mandatory, eg pension funds) that have now become toxic, especially long dated ones, thanks to the 4 massive negatives (you may call them the 4 horsemen of bond demise) that will keep bonds risky:

1) record govt debts are driving risk premium up and will keep worsening as rates increase;

2) geopolitical separation will drive deglobalisation for years to come (so no more cheap goods, which will get dearer for years to come),

3) lockdowns and net zero carbon agenda will drive higher energy costs for years to come, rippling into other costs throughout all supply chains; and

4) the war in Ukraine and likely WW3 will worsen both risk premium and supply chain disruptions

b) stuck in old theories, central banks keep hiking rates chasing inflation as it spirals out of control, creating banking/liquidity crises like the one we are seeing now - ie bank/pension balance sheets crash as bond prices collapse - resulting in solvency/liquidity concerns which lead to bank runs.

To understand how bond illiquidity and pervasive govt prescription on risk management has resulted in the mess we are now in, look at Bill Ackman's short diagnosis (article 3) or Dan Lacalle's longer missive (article 2), and finally how mobile banking + instant social media could create flash bank runs at the drop of a hat (article 4).

Seek protection in Anything But Bond/cash?

So we know this debt bust will be inevitable, how can we protect ourselves? There are several levels to position:

1) stay in the best quality and most liquid market, avoid the weaklings (eg most EU bonds/currencies, even JPY /JGBs which will suffer more in rate hike race) vs US - both cash and short dated bills;

2) park money in real assets (property/stocks/ precious metals/ even crypto) - when bond market, many times the size of equities trigger capital flights, the flood will likely be overwhelming, just buy in safe places (eg away from conflicts) or sectors that will not suffer from the cost of capital spike (eg tech);

3) more esoteric but more mobile/ alternative / off-grid assets such as paintings, antiques, etc, here is one chart that illustrates how the trend is very much underway already:

Void in crypto on/off ramping - will be filled soon?

With the pro-crypto banks now decimated, will there be a void now that prevents crypto purchases using fiat, and vice versa? That concern certainly seems valid for now, but could the clampdown be creating opportunities elsewhere, eg by a Middle East state (Dubai), China (very good strategic move if they dared, via the CNY!), that basically allow what may be an irrepressible phenomenon to grow, especially when people generally distrust the potentially tyrannical official imitation (see all the links giving reasons why CBDC will be shunned here) of the same?

Perhaps the Nigerian disastrous CBDC launch is one example:

Nigerians’ Rejection of Their CBDC Is a Cautionary Tale for Other Countries
Digital-Currency Plan Falters as Nigerians Defiant on Crypto

Just like gold's longevity in the age of fiat currencies, crypto will probably become the new digital version of gold in the CBDC dominated future...

-----------------------------------------------------article 1------------------------------------------------------------

Regulators close crypto-focused Signature Bank, citing systemic risk

 MAR 12 20236:24 PM EDT 

U.S. regulators on Sunday shut down New York-based Signature Bank , a big lender in the crypto industry, in a bid to prevent the spreading banking crisis.

“We are also announcing a similar systemic risk exception for Signature Bank, New York, New York, which was closed today by its state chartering authority,” Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC said in a joint statement Sunday evening.

The banking regulators said depositors at Signature Bank will have full access to their deposits, a similar move to ensure depositors at the failed Silicon Valley Bank will get their money back.

...

Signature is one of the main banks to the cryptocurrency industry, the biggest one next to Silvergate, which announced its impending liquidation last week. 

...To stem the damage and stave off a bigger crisis, the Fed and Treasury created an emergency program to backstop deposits at both Signature Bank and Silicon Valley Bank using the Fed’s emergency lending authority.

The FDIC’s deposit insurance fund will be used to cover depositors, many of whom were uninsured due to the $250,000 guarantee on deposits.

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/12/regulators-close-new-yorks-signature-bank-citing-systemic-risk.html

-----------------------------------------------------article 2------------------------------------------------------------

Silicon Valley Bank Followed Exactly What Regulation Recommended

12 March, 2023 | Daniel Lacalle

<below are summary points only>

 - The Silicon Valley Bank Collapse Is a Direct Consequence of Loose Monetary Policy

- The demise of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is a classic bank run driven by a liquidity event, but the important lesson for everyone is that the enormity of the unrealized losses and financial hole in the bank’s accounts would have not existed if it were not for ultra-loose monetary policy

 -  the bank’s liquidity event could not have happened without the regulatory and monetary policy incentives to accumulate sovereign debt and mortgage-backed securities.

 - The bank’s assets ...More than 40% were long-dated Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The rest were seemingly world-conquering new tech and venture capital investments.

 - Most of those “low risk” bonds and securities were held to maturity. They were following the mainstream rulebook: Low-risk assets to balance the risk in venture capital investments. 

 - The entire asset base of SVB was one single bet: Low rates and quantitative easing for longer. ...these were the lowest risk assets according to all regulations and, according to the Fed and all mainstream economists, inflation was purely “transitory”, a base-effect anecdote. What could go wrong?

 - Inflation was not transitory and easy money was not endless.

 - Rate hikes happened. And they caught the bank suffering massive losses everywhere. Goodbye bonds and MBS price. Goodbye tech “new paradigm” valuations. And hello panic. A good old bank run, despite the strong recovery of the SVB shares in January. Mark-to-market unrealized losses of $15 billion were almost 100% of the market capitalization of the bank. Wipe out.

- SVB showed how quickly the capital of a bank can dissolve in front of our eyes.

- SVB did exactly what those that blamed the 2008 crisis on “de-regulation” recommended. SVB was a boring and conservative bank that invested the rising deposits in sovereign bonds and mortgage-backed securities and believed that inflation was transitory as everyone except us, the crazy minority, repeated.

 - SVB did nothing but follow regulation and monetary policy incentives and Keynesian economists’ recommendations point by point. SVB was the epitome of mainstream economic thinking. And mainstream killed the tech star.

 - Many will now blame greed, capitalism and lack of regulation but guess what? More regulation would have done nothing because regulation and policy incentivize adding these “low risk” assets. Furthermore, regulation and monetary policy are directly responsible for the tech bubble.

- SVB invested in the entire bubble of everything: Sovereign bonds, MBS and tech. Did they do it because they were stupid or reckless? No. They did it because they perceived that there was exceptionally low to no risk in those assets. No bank accumulates risk in an asset they believe has considerable risk. The only way in which a bank accumulates risk is if they perceive that there is none. Why do they perceive it? Because the government, regulators, central bank, and the experts tell them so. Who will be next?

 - Many will blame everything except the perverse incentives and bubbles created by monetary policy and regulation and will demand rate cuts and quantitative easing to solve the problem. It will only worsen. You do not solve the consequences of a bubble with more bubbles.

https://www.dlacalle.com/en/silicon-valley-bank-followed-exactly-what-regulation-recommended/

-----------------------------------------------------article 3------------------------------------------------------------

Bill Ackman @BillAckman

...Absent @jpmorgan @citi or @BankofAmerica acquiring SVB before the open on Monday, a prospect I believe to be unlikely, or the gov’t guaranteeing all of SVB’s deposits, the giant sucking sound you will hear will be the withdrawal of substantially all uninsured deposits from all but the ‘systemically important banks’ (SIBs). These funds will be transferred to the SIBs, US Treasury (UST) money market funds and short-term UST. There is already pressure to transfer cash to short-term UST and UST money market accounts due to the substantially higher yields available on risk-free UST vs. bank deposits. These withdrawals will drain liquidity from community, regional and other banks and begin the destruction of these important institutions. The increased demand for short-term UST will drive short rates lower complicating the @federalreserve’s efforts to raise rates to slow the economy. Already thousands of the fastest growing, most innovative venture-backed companies in the U.S. will begin to fail to make payroll next week. Had the gov’t stepped in on Friday to guarantee SVB’s deposits (in exchange for penny warrants which would have wiped out the substantial majority of its equity value) this could have been avoided and SVB’s 40-year franchise value could have been preserved and transferred to a new owner in exchange for an equity injection. 

...The gov’t’s approach has guaranteed that more risk will be concentrated in the SIBs at the expense of other banks, which itself creates more systemic risk. For those who make the case that depositors be damned as it would create moral hazard to save them, consider the feasibility of a world where each depositor must do their own credit assessment of the bank they choose to bank with. I am a pretty sophisticated financial analyst and I find most banks to be a black box despite the 1,000s of pages of @SECGov filings available on each bank. SVB’s senior management made a basic mistake. They invested short-term deposits in longer-term, fixed-rate assets. Thereafter short-term rates went up and a bank run ensued. Senior management screwed up and they should lose their jobs. ...

10:38 pm · 11 Mar 2023

-----------------------------------------------------article 4------------------------------------------------------------

Lots of really bad takes about SVB. Let’s try and correct

...

The important question is why so many demanded their money back at once. And I’m not referring to the last two days. I’m asking about the days/weeks leading up to this last two days forcing SVB to sell securities and realize a $1.8B loss, necessitating a capital raise. Why were depositors withdrawing in big enough amounts before Thursday/Friday?

First, welcome to the world of mobile banking. Gone are the frictions of standing in line with tellers instructed to count money slowly. (Media images of lines Friday were largely gawkers)

How did $42 billion get withdrawn Friday alone without thousands in line? Answer, your phone! This is not the Bailey Savings and Loan anymore.

This should scare the hell of bankers and regulators worldwide. The entire $17 trillion deposit base is now on a hair trigger expecting instant liquidity.

Add in social media and millions get a message, like Peter Thiel telling Founders companies to pull out, or Senator Warren gloating that SI went under, and pick up their phone open a Chase account and Venmo-ed their life savings into it in 10 minutes. Instant liquidity (not solvency) crisis with everyone still in bed.

Banking will never be the same.

...

What needs to be done? Two things.

The FDIC needs to raise the deposit insurance ceiling to unlimited as they did this in 2008. Besides $250k is a made up number anyway. So make up a bigger number.

Banks need to get their deposit base to stop figuring out how to buy a 4.5% money market fund. They need to raise the interest rates they pay 3.00% - 3.50%, from 0.50%, immediately. Yes, this will kill bank profitability so expect Bank Execs to balk at doing this.

This way the public gets the message that you money is safe, no matter the bank, or the amount, and the rate paid on your money is at least competitive with other alternatives. So, do nothing.

Otherwise, if we are all waiting for the Fed to START a meeting at 11:30 Monday, hundreds of billions of deposits will have moved by phone and it will be far worse.

https://twitter.com/biancoresearch/status/1634885127179325440

2023年3月10日星期五

Obesity & Ageing – where to invest for better returns? 20230310

We often hear about the challenges of ageing populations, interspersed with concerned reports about how the developed world is getting fat, with concurrent health problems… But how will these factors impact general economic performance, and along with them, investment returns? This article tries to look into the phenomena in a combined fashion and assess which countries might be potential winners if current trends were to continue…

OECD markets ageing fast, Asia peaking soon…

With the rapid ageing of the working population, the world is faced with not only declining productivity, but also increased healthcare costs. As Chart 1 shows, both Europe and N America have already seen the peak in working population ratios (purple and black lines), suggesting the prime of productivity might be over.


Chart 1: Europe/N America past peak in working age population, Asia still rising into mid 2020s

Asia and S America in the meantime are still on the ascent, with rising proportion of working age population until at least the middle of the current decade. For the most favourable demographics, Africa is the top continent, with no end in sight of the rise in workers in at least the next 30 years…
Viewed another way, the drag on the economies from rising old age is demonstrated below again with Europe having the most severe increases in aged population, rising almost 10ppts between 2020 and 2050 (Chart 2), while Africa will only see less than 3ppts in increase to a still very low absolute figure over the next 30 years:

Chart 2: Europe again heads the table of elderly population, suggesting diminished vibrancy

Older and fatter – not a favourable combination?
Another factor to gauge the economic vibrancy might be how healthy the population is at large. One of the most readily available measure in this regard is the obesity ratio by country – generally the more obese the people are, the more economically stale they may be, and more sickness prone they get. Unfortunately again, the OECD (ie Europe + US) lead the race in high proportion of obese people, as shown in Chart 3 below:

Chart 3: Obesity Rate (BMI>=30) having been rising across the world from 1975-2020 – but OECD leads by big margin

Sadly for Hong Kong, the obesity measures are surging as well, with the proportion of people over 25 on the BMI measure rising from 21% in 2004 to 30% in 2015 (last available data, Chart 4), and even the youngster population cannot escape the fate – where the rise in obesity rate is also alarmingly rapid from 16% to 20% over the same period, Chart 5):


Chart 4: Hong Kong’s adult overweight and obesity rates rose between 2004 and 2015
Chart 5: Hong Kong secondary school student overweight and obesity also surging

Work affected when more are obese
In order to establish whether the level of obesity is indeed a contributing factor to economic performance, we have looked at the pattern in Europe, where there is data for absenteeism and obesity, allowing us to establish whether these two variables are correlated:

Chart 6: obesity seems to correlate with absenteeism from work due to illness (unit: days per employee per year, 2020)

Although further studies may be needed to establish a causality, but a clear correlation exists for the European countries between high obesity rate and number of sick absences. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by other studies, such as the World Obesity Federation’s prediction that economic burden brought by obesity and overweight on the global economy would rise from 2.19% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% by 2060. 

Avoid old and obese, prefer young and fit countries?
Combining these two variables in typical management consultant 2x2 matrix presentation, we arrive at the spectrum shown in Chart 7 – where:

the red marks indicate countries with both old and obese populations, which are again mostly OECD countries in Europe/N America;
while on the opposite end with green marks are countries low in obesity rates and young populations – mostly developing countries in the southern hemisphere;
between these extremes are old and ‘fit’ populations (orange marks), dominated by developed Asia; and
finally we have the young but unfit jurisdictions, unsurprisingly mostly Middle Eastern oil states (blue marks)…

Chart 7: avoid red and head for green countries? Or is the obesity a sign of economic success?

While we may have existing state of obesity and age as a measure, perhaps it is more relevant to see the possible trend increase in the coming years for assessing investment return potentials. And with this in mind, we have found the projected future ageing trend as well as obesity trajectories:

Chart 8: Old Age Proportion Increase VS Obesity Rate Increase in 10 years

Again, we can make similar colour based observations as follows:

the red marks indicate countries with the highest increases in both old and obese populations, here dominated by N America countries with a strong show of the Caribbean states;
on the opposite end of the spectrum with green marks are mostly East and Nordic European countries;
between these extremes are ageing fast but ‘staying fit’ populations (orange marks), still dominated by developed Asia.

Perhaps the clearest trend that emerges from the above studies is that OECD countries, especially N America would see the most challenge (subject to the forecasters being correct), while S Asia and East European countries being the more dynamic jurisdictions to head for – both being developing economies. Does this suggest that the age of the emerging economies have finally arrived?

Go East and South…?
The above conclusions, coupled with the record low emerging market equity valuations vs S&P500 (as a proxy for developed market stocks, Chart 9), does make the age-health twin axis look doubly appealing for emerging market investing…

Chart 9: Emerging Market Equities vs S&P500

The author would like to thank Wong Ngai Fung Wallace from The University of Hong Kong majoring in Wealth Management and So Ka Chun from The Chinese University of Hong Kong majoring in Financial Technology for assisting in data collection, analysis, and drafting this article.

2023年3月6日星期一

條件勝越泰 投資話高棉 20230306

本文亦於2023年3月6日在【信報】刊登:條件勝越泰 投資話高棉

近年投資泰國、馬來西亞和越南房產甚受港人歡迎,以至漸漸連柬埔寨樓市也開始受到關注。本文從經濟角度出發,嘗試分析這新投資市場的各基本因素(包括經濟增長,資金流等);筆者認為若果當地政府能繼續創造及維持現有優勢,柬埔寨不難成為下一個越南。


柬國固投增長 尚有15年好景?

固定資產投資佔本地生產總值的比例通常在經濟起飛,國民邁向中產時加速;如果柬埔寨的未來遵循鄰國越南(【圖一】綠線:固定資產投資佔本地生產總值比例峰值約35%)或泰國(紫線:峰值為42%)的足跡,那麼它目前的26%水平(深紅色線)仍大有上升空間——或許舉目皆是的各規劃中或在建的新機場(在這只1700萬人口的國家竟在籌劃9個機場!)、新城際道路和新高速鐵路等工程正是柬國未來十數年經濟增長的引擎:

圖一:預計柬埔寨的固定資產投資增長在15年後才到頂(越南:2010年,泰國:1999年)

 

城市化剛起步 前途一片光明

在最近的柬埔寨考察中,當地大興土木的力度令人嘆為觀止,這跟2000年代初中國地產發展起飛的境況如出一轍。而事實上,中方的人力及資本可能正是目前柬埔寨城市高速發展的主要推動力。

 

然而城市化的速度與人民致富的程度有何關係?只要再以東南亞鄰國的經驗為參考,不難看出柬國的經濟將何去何從:

圖二:只要重蹈鄰國覆轍,柬埔寨經濟似將飆升

 

從上圖可作出以下判斷:

一)隨著城市化增加,實際人均本地生產總值也會上升。2010年代的柬埔寨城市化比例僅至20%,相當於50年代的馬來西亞(或更早,因上圖數據起於1964年)、60年代的泰國、和90年代的越南!

 

二)由於柬埔寨的城市發展得享來自中國的技術和資本(此乃其他鄰國當年所欠缺的),它可能起碼在2039年便達成35%的城市化率,而在此城市化水平柬國人均收入亦達應可升至越南和泰國之間(上圖藍色虛線箭頭),亦即是其實際人均本地生產總值可有每年4.8%的增長(從2021年到2039年)。

 

三)然則,如果柬埔寨能保持目前更高速的增長步伐(即與以過去幾年一樣的斜度上升——見上圖藍色實線箭頭),而非當年泰越較慢速度的平均數,那麼人均產出水平會升得更高。以此推算,當柬埔寨的城市化率達到35%時,期間的人均本地生產總值年增長率甚至飆高至8.6%水平!但值得注意,如此高的富裕程度在泰國要等到城市化率去到52%而馬來西亞更要遲至57%才出現,相信這一結果需要在最理想的環境下方可實現。

 

不論如何,柬埔寨未來增長速度大約會在4.8-8.5%之間;而此數更是實際人均本地生產總值增長率,若以本地生產總值及名義本地生產總值來計數值只會更高!

 

人口優勢 亞洲前列

鑑於柬埔寨近史,該國的人口是亞洲國家中最年輕之一,年齡中位數只為26.5歲,僅次於菲律賓的24.5歲:

圖三:柬埔寨人口年輕且增長迅速

 

該國也是東南亞人口增長最快的國家,年增長率為1.2%。令人驚訝的是,泰國現在看起來相當「中年」,其中位年齡已達39歲,且人口增長率也跌至0.2%......也許泰國不應被視為一個具高增長地域?

 

零售消費 增長迅速

隨著財富的增加,消費水平應亦步亦趨。以上文得出的本地生產總值增長預測(每年4.8-8.6%),不難推算出未來多年零售消費的增長軌跡:

圖四:柬埔寨的消費水平應跟隨生產總值穩步上揚

鑑於人均產值與人均消費這兩項函數幾乎在每一個國家都有非常高的相關性,幾乎可以肯定柬埔寨的實際人均消費在未來18年內將以每年4.6-8.2%的幅度增長(如【圖四】中的垂直橙色箭頭所示)。在投資零售物業時如再加上城市化帶來的額外複合效應,則整體市內零售總額會更高。儘管許多大型開發商正在建造可與發達市場一些超大型購物中心相媲美的新供應,如新加坡烏節路或本港彌敦道般頂級消費地段肯定亦會在金邊出現——而一早能發掘這類地點的精明投資者將來定必賺得盤滿缽滿。

 

要全面了解整個房地產市場,住宅樓價不得不知,下圖可見2019年開始價錢下調,似乎反映中國開始收水及金邊本地供應過多;之後在疫情封關之下更急挫向下,直到2022年中似乎方現見底跡象。如果過去兩年有機需求能消化不少供應,亦會對未來樓價的走勢有所幫助:

圖五:金邊樓價自疫情後調整18%,是否現已見底?

 

綜合上述,柬埔寨地產市場有強勁的宏觀因素支撐,但微觀上供求失衡將令投資成敗取決於地區及資產類別的挑選上。除此之外,該國的海外業權法規亦會為投資者帶來額外的挑戰(例如除非透過「代理人」或信託安排外,外國人不得擁有建築物地面那層的業權)。此外政治穩定亦是一個需要仔細參詳的大課題。

 

筆者特別鳴謝香港大學財富管理系王羿丰同學及香港中文大學計量金融學系梁健東同學協助收集及整理本文相關數據及圖表。