載於2022年04月02日 【Metroland 新城地產街】 樓市焦點
焦點問題:
》俄烏局勢不穩, 導致投資環境較波動。
》今年經濟情況不樂觀, 疫情引致封關影響到經濟疲弱, 加上俄烏打仗導致第二波供應鏈斷裂。供應不足令通脹壓力增加。
》美國加息並非一次或兩次, 加息上升週期將會延續未來數年。
》因供求失衡問題難以解決, 通脹會繼續高企。
》香港樓市前景不樂觀, 未來政局不穩, 保存現金較保險。
以下為完整視頻：
2022年4月7日星期四
電台專訪：【Metroland 新城地產街 「樓市焦點」】20220402
2022年1月18日星期二
宇論舊文重溫：隧道補貼分流 不如乾脆免收 20220118
- 利民便民，節省社會資源，並且打通各個核心商業區
- 免收道路費用可提升地價、樓宇買賣印花稅，從而增加土地收益
- 政府可增加車輛牌照費以補償隧道費用的損失
2021年11月18日星期四
HK’s Ever Ballooning Public Housing Addiction Cycle 20211113
This article is also published on StandNews here: https://www.thestandnews.com/
HK’s Ever Ballooning Public Housing Addiction Cycle
In 2018, the HKSAR government announced six new initiatives on housing aimed at ‘rebuilding the housing ladder’. But with the introduction of the “Starter Homes (SH)” pilot project, the already bulging number of steps on the ladder increased to five. Not only this, the qualifying income limits for various housing welfare strata continued to be increased, for example, the income threshold for Public Rental Housing (PRH) with a 3-member household has crept from HK$22k to HK$24k.
With the ever widening net trapping more potential customers, is it any wonder that sensationalist headlines like “waiting time for public housing …the longest ever”, “waiting time …almost double the Housing Authority’s three-year service pledge” are everywhere in the media, and that the public has now been conditioned to equate “severe shortage in public housing supply” whenever housing policy is being mentioned?
The truth of the matter, sadly, is not what it seems as claimed by all the proponents of more public housing provision. In this article, we explore the real causes of the housing problems, contrary to the widespread misunderstanding permeating policy debate on this subject…
Lowering thresholds leads to perpetual shortage in housing welfare
The reality has been that the government has been constantly enlarging the pie for welfare housing, by repeatedly raising income and asset thresholds towards the upper echelons of the society, resulting well paid and asset rich citizens inadvertently sucked into the catchment of housing welfare trap. As shown in Chart 1, each of the main public housing ladders have income thresholds that are massively higher than the median income of the target population: PRH threshold is 36% higher (red arrow), Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) thresholds are a jaw dropping premium of 154% above the median income of its target population (orange arrow), and the newly launched SH scheme has an astronomically vast premium in its income threshold above even median private housing resident incomes (green arrow)!
Chart 1：Cumulative household numbers by income strata – current thresholds (Q2 21 data)
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In essense, the larger the catchment of housing welfare (ie the higher the income thresholds), the more entitled applicants there will be who do not need such welfare. We should not be surprised to see therefore that the whole society is turned into lottery buying hopefuls when state freebies are so freely available to so many – and highly paid rent seekers crowding out the genuine low income needy applicants! This mentality will cut an otherwise naturally upward flowing trade-up ladder by diverting all demand into the benefits strata, destroying an otherwise free and dynamic private market.
Drastic cure: cut income limits, halt all public housing building
The only way to reverse the vicious cycle of ever rising income/asset thresholds creating ever more demand, which feeds in ever grander public housing construction programmes, is to set the income thresholds by reference to certain percentages of the population, instead of allowing that percentage to permanently march towards 100%.
One easy way to achieve such manageable entitlement limits is by reference to median household incomes in each of the housing stratum, such as:
1) PRH income threshold @ median PRH household income, or HK$17,900 (red dotted line);
2) HOS income threshold @ median HOS household income, or HK$26,000 (orange dotted line);
3) SH income threshold @ median private residential household income, or HK$36,500 (green dotted line).
Chart 2：Cumulative household numbers by income strata – proposed thresholds
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This approach can also introduce huge administrative flexibility, allowing the government to set the thresholds at any percentiles (median being 50 percentile) of various housing strata, and progressively reduce chronic dependence on welfare housing, while freeing up more land for the private market. As more land is sold on the private market, supply there will increase, thereby lowering the market price which will reverse the pressure for the government to interfere. As the private market becomes the dominant segment liquidity and efficiency of the entire housing market is improved. (For more discussion on these aspects please see your author’s other pieces: 公屋改革面面觀─公屋「豪宅化」(Chinese only) and “Property 101: Misguided policies push up home prices”).
Wanton lifting of welfare thresholds crowds out private market
There are currently 0.84m PRH units, which already take up over a third of all households in the city, and should be absolutely sufficient to cater to the low end of the housing ladder. By the same token, HOS (0.43m units) and SH building should also terminate, so as to unleash on the private market sufficient supply both to provide choice to those who can afford private housing already, and more importantly, to restrain, if not reverse the rising private home prices.
But just how can we prove that the lengthening waiting list is a game of smoke and mirrors, scripted, directed, and played by the government for show? Here are three clues:
1) HOS income threshold (green line in Chart 3) has majorly exceeded since 2015 the 75 percentile income in all of HK, thus becoming the main competitor of luxury housing markets! During the 90s the HOS threshold was largely tracking the 75th percentile, but all pretences were shed after the resumption of HOS sale from 2013 onwards, with the magnitude of premium over 75 percentile enlarging every year – if this is not aiding and abetting the rich to buy what should be welfare housing, what else can qualify as such?
Chart 3：comparing public housing income threshold & median income bands
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2) PRH income threshold (red line) used to closely hug the overall median income levels, but has now also abandoned any façade of being a form of low-end welfare, and is fiercely competing with the private sector for high income customers!
3) The well intended policies yet again pave the roads to hell – by increasing the income thresholds more near peaks (1997, 2019) while reducing the thresholds more at market bottoms (2003) – this is procyclical, meaning more people are made eligible for public welfare at the peak (so buyers end up buying at top and lose more money), while fewer are being let in at the bottom (when they should be given the chance to purchase cheaper)… perfect irony of how ivory tower originated administrative policies always backfire!
Pro-cyclical policies amplify market risks
We now look at this phenomenon of pushing the population to buy at market tops and then shutting them out at the troughs. The premium of income thresholds over median incomes set by the mandarins always increases as prices reach peaks – eg surging from 60% in 2012 to 154% in 2020 (red arrows on right side of Chart 4) just when prices start to fall in 2019/20 (green arrows in right side). Proof again that government policies are encouraging home buyers most when prices are just about to fall.
Similar idiotic policies were also practised in the 90s – eg the mad prices rises of the early 90s (green arrows on left side) coincided precisely with the big increases in income threshold premium above median household incomes (red arrows on right side). Yet, when the prices collapsed after the Asian Crisis (green arrow in middle left), the government also shrunk the income threshold premium to a discount (red arrow in middle left).
Chart 4：Income threshold premium vs home price cycles
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On a longer time perspective, the inertial encroachment into the private housing market is independent of cycles – be it income threshold for HOS or PRH, the premium over overall income has been steadily rising (as demonstrated by the red and blue dotted lines above). This is why HK’s housing market is so sickly, and the government coffers much less abundant than it could have been (or our tax rates lower than they are now).
The only quarters that have benefited from this nationalisation of what is essentially a private asset class, has been the various vested interest groups – from bureaucrats running the housing policy, to monopolistic quangos carrying out various aspects of this unhealthy policy, to even academics or welfare groups which live off this ecosystem. Not the people of Hong Kong.
Major paradigm shift needed
All the foregoing discussion amply illustrate how the current system is creating unfairness, while distorting the free market. Your author suggested a framework above (referring to Chart 2) setting eligibility thresholds with reference to median household income percentiles. This has the advantages of:
1) Removing well to do applicants from the eligibility queue, and catering truly to only those most in need of such welfare;
2) Give people the ability to look after themselves – allowing the people of HK to decide themselves whether, or where to buy or rent their homes, rather than having to defer to the arbitrary decisions of gatekeeping bureaucrats, who’s scope and magnitude of power over people’s housing decisions seem to be increasing by the day;
3) Liberate the vitality of the private market, which is far more capable of providing what people need, when they need it, and lifting general living standards (eg ease of moving close to where work/family are located, vastly cutting commuting time); and
4) Majorly boost government coffer intakes – not only will there be no more emergency fundings needed to keep ailing quangos on lifelines, there will be significantly more stamp duty / profit tax, and land sale revenues for deploying in other more worthy public services.
By adopting the framework outlined in Chart 2 in setting the eligibility of public housing, we could save as many as 0.92million units of potential demand for HOS units (green highlight in Chart 5), while eliminating the need to build another 0.3million HOS units in the coming years (Chart 6). In fact, if the govt has lowered from 1998 the PRH eligibility to the same level as PRH median household income, almost all applicants over the past 20 years would have been allocated their homes (ie red line in Chart 6 being mostly under zero), and there would not have even been a ‘housing crisis’.
Chart 5：Eligible households who have not been awarded HOS
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Chart 6：Eligible households who have not been awarded PRH
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Such a beneficial operating model may of course undermine a few vested interest groups, but under the current executively dominant new governance environment, we are facing a golden opportunity to fully and properly cure the disease that is HK housing policy.
The author would like to thank Andy LO Tuen Yin of The Chinese University of HK and John Poon of The University of Hong Kong for assisting in data collection, analysis, and drafting of this article.
2021年11月9日星期二
公營房屋膨脹無盡 干預毒癮欲罷不能 20211109
本文亦於2021年11月9日在【信報】刊登： 公營房屋膨脹無盡 干預毒癮欲罷不能
公營房屋膨脹無盡 干預毒癮欲罷不能
政府於2018年推出六項房屋政策新措施，包括「港人首次置業」項目，意欲「重建房屋階梯」；此舉將原有的房屋梯級加多至五級，同時更每年不停地提高各類房屋的入息上限，譬如由2018年之三人家庭2萬2千元公屋收入上限節節推升至2021年之2萬4千水平。
在不斷擴闊客源政策之下，難怪《公屋輪候時間創22年新高 香港人一瓦難求》、《等到頸長！公屋申請25.38萬宗 平均輪候飆至5.8年》之類的譴責格標題比比皆是，令人條件反射式地只要一聽到房屋政策，自不然就會聯想到「公營樓宇供應嚴重不足」這個原因上來。
事實到底是否如此？且待本文抽絲剝繭，來個尋根究底……
門檻低政府自製 公屋荒後果必然
事實卻是，政府不斷在整個房屋階梯上加大自己的地盤，屢屢將收入／資產上限不斷向富裕階層推進，導致愈來愈高收入／高資產之市民無辜墮入公營房屋陷阱。如【圖一】所示，每一個公營房屋階梯之收入上限均大幅高於該階層收入中位數：公屋上限高出36%（紅箭嘴），居屋上限更超出中位數154%（橙箭嘴），新推出之首置計劃更比私樓住戶收入中位數多出135%之巨（綠箭嘴）。
在不斷擴闊客源政策之下，難怪《公屋輪候時間創22年新高 香港人一瓦難求》、《等到頸長！公屋申請25.38萬宗 平均輪候飆至5.8年》之類的譴責格標題比比皆是，令人條件反射式地只要一聽到房屋政策，自不然就會聯想到「公營樓宇供應嚴重不足」這個原因上來。
事實到底是否如此？且待本文抽絲剝繭，來個尋根究底……
門檻低政府自製 公屋荒後果必然
事實卻是，政府不斷在整個房屋階梯上加大自己的地盤，屢屢將收入／資產上限不斷向富裕階層推進，導致愈來愈高收入／高資產之市民無辜墮入公營房屋陷阱。如【圖一】所示，每一個公營房屋階梯之收入上限均大幅高於該階層收入中位數：公屋上限高出36%（紅箭嘴），居屋上限更超出中位數154%（橙箭嘴），新推出之首置計劃更比私樓住戶收入中位數多出135%之巨（綠箭嘴）。
圖一：按住戶每月入息及房屋類型劃分的累積家庭住戶數目（2021年第2季數據） |
基本上，房屋福利所網羅之服務對象越大（即入息上限越高），吸引到本來無需要依靠此福利的高收入市民就越眾，在全民皆棄私樓博抽居屋風氣之下，需求豈能不高居不下？加上在高收入階層競相搶購「有著數」之居屋風氣下，公屋住戶便更難轉向居屋，切斷房屋階梯的向上流動力度。
上限降撥亂反正 公屋停因時制宜
假若將公屋入息上限訂於全港公屋住戶入息中位數水平（$17,900，【圖二】紅虛線），居屋入息上限訂於全港居屋住户入息中位數水平（$26,000，橙虛線），及首置入息上限訂於私樓入息中位數水平（$36,500，綠虛線），不但立即能解決揮之不去的「n年上不到樓」問題，更能直接針對每個階梯中最低收入，亦是最應優先上樓市民的需求。因為在新上限下，公屋合資格戶數將大跌24%至94萬戶，居屋合資格戶數亦大縮41%，首置合資格戶數亦會回歸理性，不再佔全港總戶數90%之誇張水平：
上限降撥亂反正 公屋停因時制宜
假若將公屋入息上限訂於全港公屋住戶入息中位數水平（$17,900，【圖二】紅虛線），居屋入息上限訂於全港居屋住户入息中位數水平（$26,000，橙虛線），及首置入息上限訂於私樓入息中位數水平（$36,500，綠虛線），不但立即能解決揮之不去的「n年上不到樓」問題，更能直接針對每個階梯中最低收入，亦是最應優先上樓市民的需求。因為在新上限下，公屋合資格戶數將大跌24%至94萬戶，居屋合資格戶數亦大縮41%，首置合資格戶數亦會回歸理性，不再佔全港總戶數90%之誇張水平：
圖二：按住戶每月入息及房屋類型劃分的累積家庭住戶數目(入息上限定於息中位數) |
將入息上限定於合理的入息百分位數（percentile，如10%，30%，50%）將能極度有效地隨收入升降調整整個房屋福利階梯，不但能降低市民對福利的依賴性，而階層間之差距能得以收窄。騰出的空間能夠投向私人市場，令更多的供應能釜底抽薪，稀釋私人市場的購買力，因而減慢甚至逆轉私樓樓價不斷飆升的底因，同時大大提升整個市場的流動性（詳見另文：《公屋改革面面觀─公屋「豪宅化」》及《地產供求101：政策錯失推高樓價》）。
收入上限不停瘋漲 私樓市場屢遭侵蝕
全港現有大概84萬公屋單位，已佔總住戶數目三分一有多，絕對足夠應付基層市民需要，而居屋和首置單位也應停建，多餘的單位可以流入私人市場，供有較良好經濟能力的家庭購買，從而大大紓緩現時私樓樓價節節上升的惡性循環。
如何證明輪候冊越輪越長是政府自導自演的鬧劇？且看【圖三】三大怪象：
一）居屋入息限額（綠線）自2015年起已大大超越整體收入75百分位數，正式成為私人豪宅的第一號競爭對手——90年代仍然遮遮掩掩地跟隨75百分位數上升，但2013年重售之後直情赤裸上陣，拋離75百分位數幅度年年加大！如此大手筆鼓勵富貴戶炒樓，是否決策官僚與市場脫節
之鐵証？
圖三：入息上限與入息中位數滯後2年的比較 |
二）公屋入息限額（紅線）曾經緊貼全港入息中位數，現在卻已超越私樓入息中位數，正式強搶所有私人市場客源！
三）偉大的政府永遠在樓市周期頂端將最多的市民攬入公營房屋（即以公帑吸引市民在市頂置業，見1997，2019）樓市崩盤後卻大幅削減收入上限（見2003），令市民更難在樓價最平宜之市底入貨，這再次顯示行政主導的置業政策永遠是以良好的意願鋪築通往地獄之路。
整體收入上限無限擴大的另一後果，就是有能力在私人市場置業的市民越趨搶奪了政府能夠提供予下層市民的福利資源，收入上限的自約作用蕩然無存。
政策順周期，直接加大樓市風險
再細看以上市頂推動置業，市底送閉門羹現象。從【圖四】可見，居屋入息限額對家庭入息中位數之溢價從12年的60％狂飆至去年的154％（圖右之紅箭嘴），正正就是政府在樓市升幅下降，隨時轉升為跌時（圖右之綠箭嘴）鼓勵市民入市居屋。
同一反智政策原來在90年代已經盛行，90年代初樓價狂升之時（圖左之綠箭嘴），亦是居屋入息限額溢價加得最狠的年代（圖左之紅箭嘴），然後隨著亞洲金融風暴後的大熊市，政府卻不讓市民在低位入市置業（圖中段之紅／綠箭嘴），此何邏輯只有？
圖四：入息上限溢價與樓市周期對比 |
長遠地看，基本上政府介入樓市的惰性是獨立於樓市周期的——君不見公屋溢價亦好，還是居屋溢價，30多年來溢價趨勢基本上是直線上升（見紅／藍虛線），非常不利市場健康，亦非常重負庫房。唯一得利的，恐怕是房屋土地系列之各個利益團體，包括房屋官僚，半官方壟斷機構中之高層，或是靠此一生態謀生的學者及福利團體。
房策病入膏肓 改革刻不容緩
以上數據充分證明，現行制度正在不停地製造不公和市場扭曲。而上文所提倡之以收入中位數為依歸的公屋／居屋供應及資格框架，不但能：
一）解決福利分配的不公，令真正有需要的市民得其所居；
二）更能解放市場，令大部分的市民可按自己的情況決定是否置業，在何處安家，而無須事事問准於官僚，步步受制於與日俱增的條條框框；
三）增加私樓市場的活力，改善市民生活質素（可隨時搬往接近工作／家人的地區，省卻無數通勤時數），同時
四）令庫房收支大大改善——不但無須年年泵水資助公營機構，更能收取更多印花／利得稅，及因賣出更多土地而有更多收入去提升其他公共服務。
如跟隨【圖二】之收入標準來擬定公營房屋資格，則現在已可省回多達92萬個單位的居屋建屋量（【圖五】綠區），同時亦可免除未來須加建30萬公屋單位（【圖六】綠區）的必要性。如果政府從1998年起把入息上限調低至公住戶入息中位數，過去20年幾乎全部申請公屋的住戶都能夠被成功獲派（【圖六】紅線大部分時間在零以下），有效避免長期供不應求的情況。
如此百利而無一害之新模式，當然對不少既得利益者有打擊，但在當今行政主導能暢順運作的新環境下，實在是千載難逢的黃金改革時機。
筆者特別鳴謝香港大學房地產及建設系潘柏岐同學、香港中文大學計量金融系魯鍛言同學協助收集及整理本文相關數據及圖表
房策病入膏肓 改革刻不容緩
以上數據充分證明，現行制度正在不停地製造不公和市場扭曲。而上文所提倡之以收入中位數為依歸的公屋／居屋供應及資格框架，不但能：
一）解決福利分配的不公，令真正有需要的市民得其所居；
二）更能解放市場，令大部分的市民可按自己的情況決定是否置業，在何處安家，而無須事事問准於官僚，步步受制於與日俱增的條條框框；
三）增加私樓市場的活力，改善市民生活質素（可隨時搬往接近工作／家人的地區，省卻無數通勤時數），同時
四）令庫房收支大大改善——不但無須年年泵水資助公營機構，更能收取更多印花／利得稅，及因賣出更多土地而有更多收入去提升其他公共服務。
如跟隨【圖二】之收入標準來擬定公營房屋資格，則現在已可省回多達92萬個單位的居屋建屋量（【圖五】綠區），同時亦可免除未來須加建30萬公屋單位（【圖六】綠區）的必要性。如果政府從1998年起把入息上限調低至公住戶入息中位數，過去20年幾乎全部申請公屋的住戶都能夠被成功獲派（【圖六】紅線大部分時間在零以下），有效避免長期供不應求的情況。
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如此百利而無一害之新模式，當然對不少既得利益者有打擊，但在當今行政主導能暢順運作的新環境下，實在是千載難逢的黃金改革時機。
筆者特別鳴謝香港大學房地產及建設系潘柏岐同學、香港中文大學計量金融系魯鍛言同學協助收集及整理本文相關數據及圖表
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