After writing extensively during our due diligence trip during Easter to this once richest country on earth, the fundamental economic numbers do point to massive turnaround from very depressed levels, but the one big question that could deter actual commitment to this as an investment target remains: Can President Milei's reforms last?
To understand whether the Milei phenomenon will last, we must look at the global geopolitical pattern at large: we are now in a gigantic anti-establishment wave that will characterise economic cycles for many years to come; and thus Milei may not be a flash in the pan phenomenon of some 'whacko academic madman' hitting a random high. Let us explain this thesis in a bit more detail:
The end of a multi-decade bureaucratic expansionary cycle? The post-WW2 years have started a period of perhaps well intended, but centrist and interventionist governance wave, typified by deficit spending and ever bigger governments that made these charts look so absolutely lopsided:
The cancerous growth in the public sector led to, for example, too much Gerontocracy (left chart, in USA) enabling permanent politicians to make fortunes trading on insider legislative info, while the governments they are supposed to supervise and scrutinise go into perpetual deficit spending (right chart, not just USA, but in all developed world). The main side effect of this is the explosive increase in tax burden - big governments need big tax incomes to finance - while killing the middle class (note how little regulation there was before WW2):
There are many such charts that demonstrate such post-WW2 cancerous growth of the administrative state, but we will stop at the above three.
No wonder so many democracies now look like autocracies (see our many UK comments for details), with the state and its establishment allies increasingly targeting real representatives the people voted in as 'deplorables', 'extreme right wing', and 'populists'. That cycle seems to have reversed: now people are voting en masse against the socialist establishment, and bringing back to power, one after another, politicians who vow to fight for the common man, and not globalist causes:
Note how this movement has turned from a trickle from 2019 into a tsunami by 2025. The momentum of the counter establishment movement was gaining so much speed that the powers that be had to persecute Trump with endless lawfare, put Le Pen in jail to prevent her returning to power in 2007, and disqualify Călin Georgescu so his anti-EU policies will never see the day of light... It has now reached such farcical extent that Germany's spy agency labelled AfD'extremist entity' to ban the now most popular political force:
This wave of anti-establishment sentiment is reaching a new height in May in the UK, where local elections returned a landslide win by Nigel Farage's Reform party, decimating all other opposition in the process.
Milei - the more daring (or genuine) of the rebels
It is against this context that we view President Milei as a phenomenon that will not vanish overnight, because he is a fresh outsider with policies far more radical than many of the more jaded politicians named in the table above - most of whom having been in politics for far too long, and have become disillusioned by the bureaucratic drag that they know will undermine their policies.
Milei is different - he seems unmotivated by money and position, and he is a more fervent believer of anarcho-capitalism than just about all the rebels listed above (see analysis herefor a good summary of his beliefs). What's more, he does not mince his words:
Another example (see link here) of his no holds barred style makes him so transparent to the voters as to where he stands, unlike all politicians out there:
This is why his public spending cut drives (see this video for dramatic effect), although ambitious, could indeed work?
Will Milei succeed?
The biggest question on the minds of investors will be: does Milei have the ability to pull off his reform agenda, not being the leader of a majority party in the parliament? Here is our quick take on his various policy agenda thus far:
? = to be seen, ⍻ = partial success
One year in, we are delighted to see so many ticks or half ticks in this long list of dramatic social/economic/political reforms in the sick man of America a.k.a. Argentina. So impressed is the current reformist US to have such an ally that the Trump administration seems willing to help Milei with Argentina's debt restructuring efforts (link).
His latest big surgery is to return the Peso to market driven fair values, and is apparently succeeding - below, the black market rate premium (blue area below) has collapsed from 160% pre-Milei to near parity now:
The only previous episode when we had a similar drop was during the term of President Mauricio Macri (2015) when he lifted capital controls. The premium returned after President Alberto Fernández was elected and reinstated strict currency controls (which gave rise to property hoarding as a hedge of hyperinflation that resulted).
If we were to bet on a new future for Argentina, we need Milei and his policies to stick, at least for a typical 3-5 year minimum investment horizon for properties.
Can Milei be re-elected?
This leads naturally to the next questions - is he still popular? What are his chances of being re-elected?
First on popularity: it is heartening to see him almost as popular now as the day he stormed to power 1.5 years ago - standing at 47% support now vs 49% back in Jan 2024:
It is interesting to see that President Macri, being pro-market as well, had similar popularity levels as Milei, although starting off with much higher popularity than Milei. Across all income strata, it seems the people who support Milei most are the lower middle class and the poorest segments of the society:
And compared to all other heads of states in South America, Milei has the most constant net approval ratings, whilst fellow presidents generally suffering from rising net negative approval ratings:
So the proof of the pudding will be first the Buenos Aires election on 18th May (yes this week!), followed by the national election on 26th October (see here).
Given the widespread anti-establishment uprising around the globe described above, even the Buenos Aires election is seeing new party being formed by the former mayor (like Reform in the UK?).
If one believes in the saying 'the trend is your friend', we probably have a very high chance of free market politicians winning again in Argentina as well...
The Trump style of governance by social media makes it a very effective way to play out his Art of the Deal techniques, for example, this is his announcement of the latest rules overnight, from his Truth Social post:
By throwing his weight around, initially with Canada and Mexico, then with EU, and now with rest of the world, it shows how powerful the US, as what I would call ‘the global consumer of last resort’, can really force agenda changes around the world, and how so many other countries buckled immediately (see updated response column):
Not only is Trump quick to mount his assaults, he is equally rapid in retreating, hence today’s latest round of 90-day suspension reversal:
The violent reactions in the market is a good indicator we are in unchartered territory on this tariff issue. And the policy flipflops in the US is also contributing to the volatility.
We will chronicle the recent progress in section 1, before assessing the new geopolitical reality and how it will impact HK assets.
Fast draw, quick fire, and swift win?
Sole push-back from PRC – may still end in a deal?
The only one remaining resistance to the US tariffs is China. And what an escalation it has been (article 2, 5):
We are obviously worried this will escalate further, which will hurt everyone in the world, but are also quietly hopeful that rationality will prevail and a deal will eventually be struck. China does indeed have some powerful weapons in its arsenal, including:
a) dominant global trade position now – where it has the bulk of the international market as its partner, compared to the US, in other words, most other countries will suffer if they do not trade with China:
b) China’s large US treasuries holdings – some commentators worry about a sustained sale wreaking havoc on US’s debt and interest management:
But on closer inspection, CN’s holding of U$0.7trn of treasuries (red line above, is only 2.2% of total – red shade above), and even if they sold everything in one day, the impact would be less than 70% of the daily trade volume (black line below):
As a result we do not expect this as a meaningful lever to pull in the current trade dispute. The bigger worry should rather be how the rest of the world can keep increasing its appetite to accommodate the ever ballooning US treasury supply – now at close to $30trn a year in annual issues (bars in chart above).
c) RMB depreciation – basically for all countries facing tariff hikes, the easier route to offset (the obvious side effects of importing inflation aside), in fact, for low cost manufacturing nations, even triple digit tariffs may not result in manufacturing jobs shifting back to the USA (see article 7).
A likely outcome of the tariff war may well be the start of competitive devaluation to gain edge over other exporters. In the meantime, fast moving companies are already trying to beat the deadlines, but making dramatic moves like this:
d) escalation beyond trade – besides just tariff, both sides could get so entrenched as to start other forms of mutual sanctions, such as suggestion that US might delist PRC companies from US stock exchanges (article 6). This is where we worry most as the impact can spiral out of just trade, and hit many other sectors – eg the biggest risk to HK could be its open capital account needing access to the USD – in the most extreme case, could the HKD need to be depegged due to punitive measures from the US?
In fact smart US companies may already be plotting their exit of the HK/CN markets, and when sufficient proportions of the US corporate world have retracted (see article 4 where JP Morgan has sold its HK custody business), more severe sanctions would be much easier to be effected. Even countries are starting to view Chinese connection as a disadvantage, and siding with US in a potential geopolitical standoff (see article 1).
HK fundamentals – not too good either
Here are some factors that puts HK at risk and property prices on a downward bias:
a) Trade still too important a sector – with import/export accounting 9% of all employment in HK (light blue line), any trade spat is likely cause disproportionate amount of harm to local jobs and spending:
Total export has been seen to drive HK’s rents, and with trade falling, rents could also weaken:
b) Strong USD to depress local consumption further – it is already well aired that HK consumers are now spending weekends and holidays in cheap currency neighbours given the strong USD of the last few years. In a competitive devaluation scenario, this trend will undermine further HK’s domestic consumption – eg RMB is already down to its weakest level since 2008!
c) massive public housing supply about to hit the market – Yep, whatever the private developers hold back in supply, the govt’s usual pro-cyclical public housing policy will come to wreck the party: look at how strong the red and blue bars will surge in the next five years to take total supply in HK to the highest level since 2001:
We can only say – good luck to home buyers…
What are the possible good news from this?
This tariff episode may have its bright spots, however, such as:
– with tariff income, US can reform and abolish income tax as Trump promised;
– global markets cut domestic regulation / indirect taxes to appease the US, is structurally bullish for promoting free trade;
– China to launch massive credit easing to soften the blow => consumption spending up, trickle effect down to HK perhaps…
– HK and China both work harder to developer global South markets (article 3), opening up more diverse revenue streams in the process
Sino Chairman Robert Ng, Children Named Under Singapore Foreign Influence Law
2025/04/07 by Michael Cole
Singapore is set to declare one of its wealthiest property tycoons and three of his children as “politically significant persons” under a law designed to prevent foreign meddling in the country’s politics.
China sticks to its guns as fresh US tariff threat pushes tension to the brink
BEIJING/SHANGHAI, April 8 (Reuters) – China vowed on Tuesday to “fight to the end” against U.S. tariffs as some citizens railed against President Donald Trump after he singled out Beijing for further levies, setting the stage for a standoff between the world’s two largest economies.
Hong Kong eyes Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern business ties in next chapter of belt and road plan
William Yiu 17 Feb 2024
Hong Kong will focus on business collaborations with Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries under the country’s belt and road plan, the head of the initiative’s local wing has said amid plans to launch a festival championing the scheme among residents.
JPMorgan picks HSBC, StanChart to run $500 bln custody business in Hong Kong, Taiwan
By Selena Li March 1, 2024
HONG KONG, March 1 (Reuters) – JPMorgan Chase (JPM.N), opens new tab has selected HSBC (HSBA.L), opens new tab and Standard Chartered (STAN.L), opens new tab to operate its custody businesses in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with assets worth more than $500 billion, a spokesperson for the U.S. bank said.
Beijing prepared for US tariff retaliation: Regina Ip
2025-04-08
The central government is well prepared and has a broad arsenal to respond to any further tariff escalation by US President Donald Trump, according to Executive Council convenor Regina Ip.
Delist Chinese stocks from US indices? Trump administration says ‘everything’s on the table’
9 Apr 2025
US’ Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has said that “everything’s on the table” when it comes to removing Chinese companies from American stock exchanges, amid the ongoing tariff war between Washington and Beijing.
He apparently has no idea how much this will hurt US consumers and how little it will affect the trade deficit. Asian manufacturers and their investors can, to a large extent, sleep easy tonight.
The much awaited 'by country score card' of US tariffs is finally out overnight (see article 1). What is clear is the US's determination to level the playing field, as it has been 'ripped off' by trading partners which have far more punishing trade duties/barriers than US:
The distribution of the tariff rates can be seen from article 1 as well, but here is the global distribution from low tariffs (green) to high (red) - it is obvious that the whole Asian export complex is hit, even US's traditional allies S Korea and Japan:
Most hurt of course are the SEA nations which have received much offshoring and reshoring investment in recent years. But what the currency markets have reflected are positive surprises for Japan and Switzerland (blue circles), while Thailand and S Africa (red circles) may have been more punished than expected:
Whilst not surprising, the US also closed the loop on China's small parcels route to exporting given earlier brief tariff imposition which was quickly reversed. To show how big the Chinese parcel export industry has become, this is an excellent chart:
Yes you got it right, out of top 20 cities that sell on Amazon, only 7 cities are non-Chinese, which take the top 4 spots by a wide margin...
By trade bloc impact assessment
Below we have broken down the impacted nations by trade blocs - OECD (orange), SEA (blue), and N Asia (green):
reference to nations' response are given at the end
The key impact columns are 4th from right, indicating which country is hit hardest within that bloc: EU was punished hardest in OECD, while Cambodia/Laos/Vietnam hurt most in SEA, and China/Taiwan both are bruised more than peers.
On a total economic materiality basis (5th column), top 3 hit countries are Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan. The latter being the most surprising entry in our study...
Obviously this is just Trump's opening salvo, and as the 'Art of the Deal' requires, give and take will eventually result in a quite different set of results from this announcement. We await the wide ranging negotiations to begin from today... obviously the more flexible the country is in its executive decision making, the quicker they will reduce the impact of these reciprocal tariffs... Our guess is that most SEA nations fall into this category.
We now know the full extent of Trump's reciprocal tariffs. They’re huge.
April 3, 2025
“Liberation Day” turned out to be alarming. President Trump floored investors by announcing the largest tax hike on Americans since at least the 1940s.
[...]
The April 2 announcements included two sets of import tariffs. One is a new “universal” tax on imports from everywhere. The average tariff rate on imports at the start of the year was about 2.5%. So the 10% universal tariff on its own would raise the average tariff to 12.5%. That would be the highest since around 1940.
[...]
Americans bought about $3.3 trillion worth of imports in 2024. The tariff rate of about 2.5% yielded a tariff tax bill of about $83 billion. Investing firm Evercore estimates that all the new tariffs combined will push the tax rate on imports to about 29%.
Trump signs order that closes duty exemptions for cheap shipments from China
April 3, 2025
[...]
The order says Trump is ending duty-free treatment for the covered goods imported from China and Hong Kong starting at 12:01 a.m. ET (0401 GMT) on May 2, according to a fact sheet provided by the White House.
Morgan Stanley Sees Tough Road for Trump Deals With China, India
[...]
China is the most exposed to these tariffs, followed by India and Vietnam, according to a research note sent to clients on Wednesday. These three countries could also find it more challenging than other economies in the region to sign a pact by April, according to analysts led by Chetan Ahya.
[...]
“President Trump’s focus on fixing the US’ large and persistent trade deficit means that Asia will be exposed,” the analysts wrote, adding that much of the risk to the region’s economies will come not just from the direct hit of the tariffs. “The indirect effects of tariffs matter more – that is, the persistence of trade tensions will weigh on corporate confidence, capex and trade.”