RTHK Interview / 專訪— King Sir會客室：Bricks&Mortar主席兼總裁 王震宇

筆者早前獲香港電台邀請接受King Sir訪問，與兩位主持人及各聽眾分析從美國縮表及加息對樓市之影響、歐債危機之探討以至未來2018年香港樓價走勢。以上乃筆者受訪片段之節錄。

遲來的春天：政府終於研究六隧分流 紅隧獅隧加費 公帑補貼西隧減價 20171114

早於二零一零年，筆者已提議幾項疏導隧道擠塞問題之方案（見：西隧加價無罪，政府袖手有失），望能拋磚引玉。遑遑逾七載，政府方姍姍來遲，甫研究以公帑補貼西隧減價（見下文）。如此議而不行，實非市民之福！望政府能把握時間，急市民所急，盡早解決隧道瓶頸。

六隧分流 倡紅隧獅隧加費 料2021年全超負荷 擬公帑補貼西隧減價
《明報》2017年11月14日

【明報專訊】政府去年8月起接管東區海底隧道，隨即研究3條過海隧道（東隧、紅隧、西隧）的分流安排，根據政府顧問初步評估，由於該3條隧道與3條由沙田至市區的陸上隧道（大老山隧道、獅子山隧道、尖山及沙田嶺隧道）使用量互有影響，故隧道費調整需以六隧為基礎。政府建議紅隧及獅隧必須加費，其替代隧道同時減費，並藉公帑補貼減低西隧收費。

上班時間紅隧超負荷77%
立法會交通事務委員會本周五討論六隧分流初步評估結果，運輸及房屋局昨向立法會提交文件，指4條隧道的車流在繁忙時間已超過其設計容量，以紅隧最擠塞，早上及傍晚繁忙時間的車流分別較設計容量超出77%和69%，但西隧和尖山及沙田嶺隧道車流仍低於其設計容量（見表）。運房局預計，若隧道費不變，六隧車流在2021年的繁忙時間將超出其設計容量。而中環灣仔繞道明年底至2019年初通車後，將增加西隧車流，但西隧尚有空間接收分流自紅隧及東隧的車。

紅隧獅隧收費18年未調整
運房局表示，將在本立法年度向立法會提交隧道費調整方案，由於顧問經初步評估，認為社會各界提出的5類方案無助改善繁忙時間使用率過高的隧道車流（見另稿），故局方建議應按7項框架探討具體方案，包括調整隧道費時應涵蓋六隧，六隧亦不應「零收費」，以免引起額外車流；又建議適度上調紅隧及獅隧收費，並同時減低其替代隧道收費，因為兩隧位處本港中央，有最佳的連接道路網絡，收費亦最低，並自1999年起未曾調整，但政府未有提出加幅。現時紅隧及獅隧的私家車隧道費分別為20元及8元。

重點調整私家車的士電單車收費
至於各類車輛的收費，局方認為調整重點在於私家車、的士及電單車收費，指這3種車佔所有隧道總交通流量約73%，綠色專線小巴及巴士則因行走固定路線而不建議加費。運房局又指可先在周日及公眾假期試行不同時段有不同收費，因車流較平日低，長遠應探討設立隧道費調整機制。

陳帆﹕對所有方案持開放態度
西隧專營權2023年屆滿，運房局稱，會與西隧專營公司商討在收回西隧前，運用公帑提供補貼令西隧減價，但不排除最終未能與西隧達成協議。

運房局長陳帆昨晚出席活動後表示，文件是陳述概念及對現况的中期分析，政府聽取立法會議員意見後將深入分析，現階段對所有方案持開放態度。對於西隧專營權期限仍未屆滿，他指政府會尊重合約精神，冀透過商討與西隧專營公司達成協議，令西隧在專營權屆滿前不要加價。

議員倡管理需求　提早回購西隧
立法會交通事務委員會委員胡志偉認為，政府藉調整隧道費以改變司機選擇隧道是「捉錯用神」，應循需求管理方向解決。另一委員田北辰則認為，3條過海隧道中，紅隧因位置優越而收費應最貴，西隧則第二貴，東隧最便宜，並提出應在合理條件下與西隧公司探討提早回購西隧的可能。

香港運輸研究學會資深會員熊永達表示，西隧實際收費（私家車65元）遠低於現時法定收費（私家車225元），政府應解釋以公帑補貼是以哪種收費為基礎，並相信六隧收費調整或於政府接管西隧後才推行。

TVB Interview / 專訪—日日有樓睇‧樓市把脈 20171108

Above is a recent feature interview by Hong Kong's TVB channel, in which we highlighted the following key issues facing the local housing market:
a) with the end of the USD correction in October, HK dollar assets will face headwinds;

b) higher than market expected interest rates are likely in the coming year, putting more pressure on housing assets in HK;

c) current government policies to encourage home ownership will likely result in the weakest segment of the society ending up in negative equity when the housing cycle turns down;

d) the best way to address the high prices is to convert all public housing supplies into private market supplies. By shifting supply into public housing, the government is directly pushing up home prices as supply is diverted into the non-buying portions of the housing ladder;

e) the government is setting too high income thresholds and keeps raising them (eg PRH threshold now covers 43% of HK households, HOS threshold is higher than 78% of HK households, while the Green Form Subsidised Home Ownership Scheme extends over 86% of all HK households). This creates a false impression of ever rising demand for housing welfare, when the proper way to restrict demand is to lower the thresholds so only the truly needy will qualify to join the waiting lists.

以上采訪出自香港無綫電視專訪，其中筆者指出了本地樓市存在的一些關鍵的問題：

a）現時樓價向下的風險較向上風險大，由於美金剛完成調整，現在開始反彈，因此港元資產會趨向走弱；

b）環球息率向上會多於市場預期，也會增加樓市風險；

c）現時樓價已經接近頂端，而政府推出的各項鼓勵市民置業的政策卻鼓勵最無承受力的市民在樓價下跌時淪爲負資產；

d）針對樓價高企的最好政策，莫過於將公營房屋土地全部撥入私人市場，政策過度傾斜公營房屋會為樓價火上加油，因爲供應被轉往不能影響市價的板塊；

e）政府所定的公營房屋入息限額過高也會令樓市升溫（例如：公屋入息限額已經覆蓋四成三家庭，居屋入息限額已經覆蓋七成八家庭，而綠置居入息更覆蓋高達八成六住戶） 這造成了福利房屋需求强勁的假象--更正確的做法應該降低公營房屋入息門檻以服務真正有需要的市民。

財務策劃會議 各界翹楚獻策

載於信報2017年9月28日

筆者早前獲邀參與財務策劃會議論論壇，與各位財金官員及金融業翹楚擔任演講嘉賓。
施永青先生跟筆者均認為現時香港的樓價已經偏高，並非合適入市之時機，鑑於香港仍擁有太多存款，樓價因此未能下跌。

同時筆者亦在論壇表示若美國縮表及加息步伐加快，將成為明年推動樓市下跌其中一個主因。

Time to Duck when celebs Quack?

It appears that the Hong Kong property market is reaching a fever pitch of late, with a string of news on record high prices being achieved. However, there is an ‘entertaining’ twist to this phenomenon, in that more and more entertainers (ie movie stars, singers) are reported to be buying properties – indeed, year to date this group of buyers have acquired over HK$1bn worth of bricks and mortar, involving over 44,000 square feet of space (Table 1):

Table 1: property purchases by celebrities in 2017

Source: media reports

One should not simply draw conclusions about any significant trends just because a particular group of people are behaving en masse. However, one should surely delve deeper when any phenomenon starts to exhibit extreme patterns – this article looks into the extraordinary symptom of celebrity purchases to aid readers in their own property decisions.

Celebs often seen buying when markets are hottest

Whether or not the property market is overvalued or a good buy depends on how far from longer term trends the price is at any point in time. In this article the author uses Centaline index versus its 3-year moving average as an indicator of over/under valuation (see red area in Chart 1, for more immediate price action, the red line works well too). And to quantify the frequency of celebrities’ property purchases, a simple and reliable indicator might be the search frequency of the keywords ‘celebrities’ and ‘home buying’ in Google Trends (blue line in Chart 1).

Chart 1: Frequent purchases by celebrities presage home price correction ahead

One could identify from the chart above these interesting patterns:

1.      The purchase frequency of celebrities coincides with the cycle of property prices closely (it is a shame that one cannot observe the relationship back to the previous market top in 1997, as Google Trends data does not go beyond 2004)

2.      Whenever the purchase frequency of artists reached a peak, home prices would soften or even fall a year later (red line in Chart 1)

For example, in the lead up to the market top just prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, the buying frequency reached a high of 76%. This was followed shortly by the Global Financial Crisis and a 20% fall in home prices one year later. On the other hand, during the period of weak market sentiment in mid-2016 when the buying-frequency fell to a low of 42%, home prices spiked a handsome 22% in the 12 months that followed!

It pays to shadow the actions of tycoons?

Another group of market participants, also active in the Hong Kong property market, are the super-rich tycoons (represented by the blue line in Chart 2); they seem to have diametrically opposite track records compared to the artists – perhaps the tycoons have more information at their finger-tips, or because they act on purely profit motive (rather than to follow the heart), they seem to have a highly profitable outcome in their dealings:

Chart 2: Tycoon sales seem to be followed by drops in home prices a year later

It is possible to identify two sets of patterns from the above chart:

1.      Fluctuations of tycoon property sales also coincide closely with the home price cycle;

2.      Home prices tended to correct or fall when more tycoons dispose of their properties (red line in Chart 2)

As an illustration, at the same time the celebs (i.e artists) were buying big time in 2008, the frequency of disposals by tycoons was also at its highest (when the reading reached a maximum of 100% in the series). Then in early 2016, when tycoon sale frequency fell to a low of 45%, home prices increased smartly in the year that followed. Crucially important for readers to note is the fact that the tycoon sale frequency has surged to 98% in recent months once again…

Subdivide-and-dump and hiving-off work well for tycoons too

Tycoons likely hold large portfolios of assets, if not listed companies holding the same in addition. They may therefore be able to lighten up their portfolios through other means than straight sales – subdividing larger properties into small units for sale, or listing on the stock exchange richly valued vehicles from their holding companies – come to mind.

If one is to search for a different set of terms on Google Trends, such as ‘hiving off’ + ‘properties’ (Chart 3 below, note the Chinese search terms used have a dual meaning of subdivision and spin-offs), one arrives at the same price reaction as the ‘tycoon’ + ‘sell properties’ terms analysed above. Putting the two sets of search combinations together, they indeed exhibit almost identical profile (see Chart 4).

Chart 3: Tycoons hiving off their assets also bode ill for property prices

Chart 4: Tycoons selling have near identical timing as artists/celebs buying

If the magnitude of change in home prices follows the red arrow in Chart 3, there is significant risk to the sustainability of housing market in the months ahead. Readers should exercise even more caution when considering buying homes.

Conclusion: Don’t buy from tycoons, and don’t scramble alongside artists

The above analysis yields three sets of conclusions:

1.      When big property companies increase their pace of disposals, especially subdividing or selling ever smaller units, it is often also the time when celebrities in the entertainment circles scramble to buy properties;

2.      The above phenomenon is a strong signal that the property market may be about to weaken, even collapse;

3.      Celebrities in the entertainment industry have hectic lives, and could be also more prone to acting on impulse than analysis. They could increase their chances of investment success if they employ the skills of seasoned professional advisors, both in the timing and execution of their purchases/sales, and in the ongoing management of the properties they hold. To stand better chances against the buy-high-sell-low symptom outlined above, our artists should avoid being swept off their feet by hot market sentiments, or by the sweet-talking from property agents.

The author would like to express gratitude to Mr Yeung LI of The Chinese University of Hong Kong for his contribution in the writing of this article.

明星也掃貨，樓市將見頂？

載於信報2017年8月24日

近期樓市氣氛熾熱，樓王新高記錄不絕於耳，但這類新聞卻多了一重娛樂性，就是演藝界爭相入市的報道越見頻繁，單是2017年至今，明星買樓已涉資超過十億元，總樓面面積亦逾四萬呎：

表一：2017年內明星入市之個案

資料來源：各大報章

當然，只看某類買家身份之報道不足以推斷任何重要的趨勢，但當任何現象的比例開始大異於常規時，就是尋根究底的好時候。俗語有云：當鐘擺蕩向一個極端，每是趨勢轉向之時。本文就此「異象」稍作探討，希望為讀者提供多一項出入市的參考指標。

價高市旺時，娛圈入貨頻

樓市是否高風險或抵買可由樓價指數偏離較長線趨勢之幅度來判斷，本文且以中原指數對其三年移動平均線作指標，下稱「樓價－3年平均比」（【圖一】紅色片區）；同時，若要量化娛樂圈入市的頻率，較方便的方法可能是於「谷歌趨勢」內搜尋相關詞語，如「明星」及「買樓」（【圖一】中藍線）：

圖一：明星大舉入市，似乎預示未來樓價偏軟

從上圖可見兩個現象：

一）明星入市頻率的高低，近年多與樓價的起伏周期相吻合（谷歌數據延伸不到2004年以前，故可惜見不到上次市頂，即97年時的趨勢）；

二）每當藝人買樓次數拔高，一年後樓價多出現偏軟甚至下降的情況（圖中紅線）。

08年大時代後，雷曼爆煲之前，明星買樓的頻率達到76%的高峰，但數月後金融海嘯爆發，樓市在隨後12個月大跌20%。相反地，在16年中，樓市信心疲弱之時，藝人入市比例跌至42%水平，然而其後樓價在一年間飆升22%之多！

跟大孖沙行動，勝算較高？

掉轉過來，同時亦活躍於樓市的「大孖沙」（【圖二】中藍線，非香港讀者請見維基定義：https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hk/%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%96%E6%B2%99），因掌握充分市場資訊，加上利字當頭（而非感性為先），行動果斷，往往能屢戰屢勝：

圖二：大孖沙出貨一年後，樓價多數走弱

上圖亦可看到兩個現象：

一）大孖沙出貨周期與樓市周期同樣地吻合；

二）在這些大亨大幅放售物業之後，樓價多會回調甚至下跌（圖中紅線）。

例如08年明星大舉入市的同時，亦是大孖沙出貨比例最高之際（系列最高為100%）；反過來，16年初，彼等出貨率跌至45%，之後一年樓價卻節節上升。更重要的是，大孖沙出貨頻率近月已經抽升至98%水平，實在值得投資大眾留意！

拆售物業，殊途同歸

既然稱得為大孖沙，當然不是手持單位兩三隻爾，故此，無論是將物業分拆為較小單位出售，抑或由其上市公司剝離組合中資產，甚至將已上市之資產再分拆上市，都是財技高手常用之出貨策略。亦因此，若搜尋「分拆」加「物業」的頻率，其與樓價走勢之相關性應和以上「大孖沙」加「物業」加「出售」相若，如【圖三】所示。而比較兩組搜尋結果，其發生頻率及波動都大同小異，見【圖四】：

圖三：分拆物業一年後，樓價多回軟

圖四：出貨/分拆/明星入市之行為極為相近

倘若樓價變幅如【圖三】紅箭嘴所示，未來一段時間的大市展望可能不妙，欲買樓的讀者更應小心了！

總結：勿接孖沙貨，避與藝人争

以上分析可得出三個結論：

一）大財團頻頻拆售單位，尤其是「劏細」而沽，通常在時機上會遇著娛樂圈名人爭相入市（見【圖四】）；

二）這現象正是樓市處於強弩之末，即將轉弱的強烈訊號；

三）明星工作忙碌，亦多為感性中人，如能委託專業人士運籌帷握、管理投資，而非跟隨傳媒風潮或中介巧舌，則以上高買低賣的宿命幾可避免爾！

筆者特別鳴謝中文大學會計系學生李洋協助收集及整理本文相關數據及圖表

Have mainland home prices peaked? How reliable is official price information?

Since the start of the bull market in early 2015, the magnitude of average price rises of the 70-city basket in China has reached 30%; the trend accelerated further in early 2016 (eg. Shenzhen prices were up 16% in Q1 alone), triggering a wave of government crack down policies in Q4 2016 in an attempt to rein in the run-away prices. To date, over 20 cities have launched their versions of policies, but the impressive performance of the domestic property stocks in recent months could herald further home price increases ahead. This article attempts to look into the nature of the official statistics that stand behind these incredible price increases.

Official statistics suggest further price rises ahead

Many market commentators and analysts follow the property market in China by tracking the ‘Price Indices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings in 70 Large and Medium-Sized Cities’ published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – we will refer to this below as the official indices.

Under normal circumstances, the property market should be close to, or at a peak when the bulk of the basket cities are showing price rises (green bars in Chart 1). To illustrate, when the green bars begin to grow from the bottom (e.g. in April 2012 and April 2015), home prices usually rise, as proxied by Guangzhou (red line); on the other hand, when the green bars begin to shrink from high levels, a down-trend in property prices should also ensue (as shown in July 2011 and April 2014).

Chart 1: Official data suggest that the bull market has more to run

If one applies this relationship to the above chart, one may reach the conclusion that the current bull market in prices will continue because the green bars are still some distance from reaching the peak yet. However, the reality is not quite as straightforward as the above simple relationship suggests.

Is it the market or market statistics that local governments are trying to manage?

While gathering data for analysis, this writer has noticed a curious pattern – that whenever there is a meangingful surge in home prices, the official indices tend to lag comparable non-official ones; as shown in Chart 2, from a common starting point of 100, when steep rises in the non-official indices (red arrows) take place, the official equivalents (blue arrows) often underperform, with the blue line either remaining flat or even falling. It seems there is a mismatch between the official indicators and reality. In a short period of under eight years, the non-official index is now some 69% higher than the official index.

Chart 2: Official index always lagged behind in bull markets

Chart 3 provides another perspective on this discrepancy. Rebounds in home prices during bull markets (i.e. when the red line rises, represented by the upward sloping red arrows, e.g. from mid-2012 to mid-2013) have been accompanied by big outperformances in non-official indices vs their official equivalents (represented by rising non-red lines, which are collectively annotated by the upward blue arrows). Furthermore, this deviation happens in all the cities, and magnitudes of outperformance are not reverted during the downcycles (e.g. between late 2013 and early 2015), suggesting that the issue is not limited to isolated cases, but is a systematic aberration.

Chart 3: Non-official price index rises tend to outpace official ones 

Another intriguing observation is that how far official indices deviate from non-official indices depends on how far that city is away from the capital: while the official index of Beijing (light blue line in Chart 3), which is right under the nose of the central government, did not drift too far away from the non-official indices in the past few years, that of Tianjin (dark blue line in Chart 3), which is a bit more ‘out of sight’, was able to lag non-official readings by over 100%!

Chart 4 clearly shows the local governments’ practice of understating the substantial rises in home prices in order to avoid drawing attention or policy crackdowns from the central government.

Chart 4: The bigger the price increase (x-axis), the bigger the gap against non-official indices (y-axis)

This is understandable behaviour given the civil service performance system in China – officials’ future prospects are tied closely to the rate of GDP growth in their sphere of influence, providing great incentive for them to maximise their reported economic output. At the end of the day, gross capital formation has been major component of GDP calculations, making up 40%-50% of GDP growth (Chart 5), and in turn the housing sector with its related industries are a significant driver of capital formation. It is no wonder that local officials are tempted to grow their own housing investments as fast as possible while under-reporting this fact, because their political careers are heavily dependent on the continued boom of this sector.

Chart 5: Significant contribution of Capital Formation induces data manipulation

Once the drivers of behaviours are revealed, it is not hard to understand why the gentle rises in official indices are so inconsistent with both non-official figures, and even more at odds with news reports of soaring home prices. Tampering with official statistics may be the easiest way for local officials to produce flashy GDP figures while avoiding being accused of stoking housing bubbles!

Non-official data suggest home prices may have peaked

Given the lower reliability of the official statistics, it is perhaps more appropriate to deduce (using non-official data) the ratio of basket cities experiencing inflating home prices discussed in Chart 1. This exercise results in a picture from which one would draw an opposite conclusion on the state of the market: by as early as Q2 2016, the home prices in all of the basket cities could have already been rising. In other words, the green bars have rocketed to 100% (Chart 6) well before indicated in Chart 1, and at speeds far more rapid than the up-cycles in 2010-11 and 2013-14!

Chart 6: Non-official data suggest that home prices may have already peaked

As the green bars have already reached the top for over a year, the author fears that the housing market may soon correct, if it has not already started to do so. It is regrettable that the unreliability of official data makes it hard to diagnose the symptoms, and yet another opportunity to deflate the housing bubbles could have been missed.

To conclude, the above analysis serves as a good example to support reports that official statistics in the mainland lack robustness, and in this case, confidence in housing data may be further undermined as well. In terms of investments, readers might want to consider selling physical properties in the mainland; however, exposure to housing can be maintained by putting the proceeds in mainland property stocks, some of which still trade at reasonable valuations and have growth factors besides just the residential sub-segment.

With special thanks to Eugene Lai and Stewart Ng for their contribution to this article.

【司機福音！】拍八達通即過隧道 月中城隧先行

早於二零一零年，筆者已提出於收費隧道安裝八達通收費系統以提高運輸效率（請參閱：香江使用八達通有進步空間），七年後，政府終於引入電子繳費設施（見下文）。亡羊補牢，未為晚也！

文章報導如下（載於明報2017年7月13日）：

「政府收費隧道一直以人手及「快易通」電子系統收費，由本月中開始將分階段在8條政府收費隧道及道路，引入「停車拍卡」式電子繳費設施，屆時駕駛者可使用八達通、感應式信用卡等非接觸式智能卡繳費，節省人手找續時間。

根據運輸署提交予沙田區議會的文件指出，首階段的「停車拍卡」式電子繳費設施將於本月23日於城門隧道實施。香港仔隧道則於9月實施，紅隧則於10月實施。而獅子山隧道、將軍澳隧道、青沙公路、青嶼幹線及東隧亦將陸續由今年年底至明年7月實施「停車拍卡」設施。
運輸署去年獲立法會財委會撥款，於7條政府收費隧道及道路，引入停車拍卡式電子繳費設施，涉及成本約4553萬元，預計每年營運開支為1500萬元。」

內地樓價已經見頂? 官方統計是否可信?

載於信報2017年7月11日

自從内地樓價由二零一五年初展開升浪以來，70市平均升幅至今已達30%，加上一六年初瘋狂的飆升（如深圳第一季漲價竟達16%），引發第四季起各市政府相繼加大對樓市的調控力度，至今已起碼二十多個城市出手。雖然樓價升幅因而有所收斂，內房股近月升幅可觀，似乎在預示下一樓市升浪之來臨，事實到底是否這樣？本文且作粗略探討。

官方數據顯示升勢未盡

不少市場人士以内地統計局發布之「七十大中城市二手房屋價格指數」（以下簡稱官方指數）來判斷樓市趨勢。一般情況下，當一個全國性樓市周期見頂之際，應該亦是70市中絕大多數呈現升幅之時：如【圖一】所示，當綠色條比例由低位抽升之時（一二年四月及一五年四月）亦是樓價由跌轉升，或繼續走強之際，如圖中廣州樓價（紅線）。相反，若綠色條比例見頂回落，則預示樓價亦將亦步亦趨，跟著下調（如一一年七月和一四年四月）。

圖一︰官方數字似乎標誌内地樓市上升動力尚未衰竭

若將此一關係應用於現在，可能會由上圖得出「綠色條升勢尚未見頂，樓市應有餘勁」的結論。到底事情是否如此簡單？

地方政府在調控統計數據而非樓市本身？

在搜集數據時，筆者發現一個不尋常現象，就是每當樓市飆升之時，官方指數往往會開始落後於私人機構類似數據，如【圖二】所示，若大家的出發點皆為一百的話，在非官方數據（紅色箭嘴）上升坡度變陡時，官方指數卻不但追不上升幅，更出現橫行，甚至下降的形態（藍色箭嘴），似乎與實情甚有出入:

圖二︰官方指數每當市道旺盛時就巧合地落後於非官方樓價指數

由另一角度來分析，在【圖三】中紅線抽升時（紅箭嘴），代表樓市極度暢旺，價格亦大幅攀升（如2012年中至2013年中）；然而，非官方指數亦會在同時大幅跑贏各相應之官方指數（圖中藍箭嘴）。更甚者，此一現象不是只發生於某一城市，而是在各大城市同時出現，而且在樓市調整時跑贏幅度卻不會因而降低（如2013年底至2015年頭），可見此現象實乃一個系統性的問題。

圖三 ︰樓價抽升時往往可見非官方指數大幅拋離官方指數

另一有趣現象，則是「山高皇帝遠」現象：在天子腳下之北京，過去數年之累積偏差只為低雙位數（上圖淺藍線），但是中央稍不著重的如天津（上圖深藍線）則能「逍遙法外」，在同時間內樓價指數被非官方數據拋離近一倍有多！

此一「報憂不報喜」怪象在【圖四】充分顯示出來，代表地方政府擔憂該市樓價升幅過急會招來中央的壓力，令自己成為調控目標。

圖四：凡樓價升幅大時（X軸右方），則官方指數升幅跑輸幅度亦加大（Y軸上方）

當然，在內地官場以GDP增長為主要評核政績指標的文化下，所有地方政府都有盡量做大經濟產值的誘因，畢竟，資本形成佔去總經濟增長的四至五成之巨（【圖五】綠條）；如果失去了樓市這個火車頭，則鄰市同僚必能步步高陞，平步青雲，自己可能烏紗不保……

圖五 ：資本形成佔國內産值比重最大，為官方誇大數據提供誘因

只要知道了地方政府行為之就裏，就不難明白為何近年新聞報道中樓市火辣，價格狂飆這個表象，與官方樓價指數只是緩中有升顯得如此格格不入了。只有通過對當地樓市數據的「約束」，各地官僚方能既交出亮麗的GDP成績表，又不須負上製造樓市泡沫之悪名！

套用非官方數據 樓市已經見頂

既然官方數據出現大量水份，筆者唯有以非官方指數來推斷【圖一】中70市中樓價上升之城市比例。得出另一截然不同的圖畫，即是所有70城市可能已於2016年第二季見到樓價同比上升；換言之，綠色條早已升至百分百水平（見【圖六】），而且勢頭比2010-11年及2013-14年強得多！

圖六 ：根據非官方數據，内地樓市理應早已見頂

由此可見，既然綠色條已沒再上升的空間，兼且此情況亦持續了接近一年有多，筆者恐怕內地樓市如非已經進入下降周期，亦將於短期內開始下跌。令人擔憂的卻是，在數據不實的環境下，當局難以為樓市對症下藥，錯失了又一個擠走泡沫的良機。

總括而言，内地統計數據的可信性長期受外界質疑似乎並非空穴來風，以上的分析已足以令人對官方樓價指數的信心打一個折扣。在投資部署上，應在短期內以套現實物房產為上策；至於內房股，由於不少估值仍然吸引，及有其他住宅樓市以外的考慮因素，故仍可擇優而持有之。

筆者特別鳴謝香港大學學生賴以正協助收集及整理本文相關的數據及圖表。

【Metro Radio - 新城地產街 20170701】

七月一日香港回歸二十周年，九七年前特首董建華提出八萬五建屋計劃， 九八年亞洲金融風暴和二千年科網熱潮爆破，樓價由九七年高位大跌七成，至二零一三年沙士，到近期樓市氣氛熾熱，樓市經歷不同變化，有好多人都將現在樓市與九七年相比，究竟有何相同或不同之處？公私型房屋政策有何看法？對新一屆政府班子又有何期望？

今集嘉賓：Bricks and Mortar 主席兼總裁王震宇

香港的寫字樓與零售樓宇分佈是否恰當？

載於信報2017年6月22日

近期中環美利道商業地皮創出歷史新高之總價（233億）及樓面地價（每呎5萬元），不難令人懷疑這是否供求失衡的結果，筆者借此機會在本文中探討商業樓宇之供應情況。

在過去三十多年中，本港寫字樓及零售物業的存量都在穩定增長；然而，寫字樓的增幅卻一直快於零售物業（【圖一】紅條）：兩者的總樓面面積比例由1981年之0.62倍大升68%至2016年1.04倍。

圖一：寫字樓面積增長持續快於零售樓宇

此次中環新地王的產生，可歸功於多項因素，包括現時的超低利率環境，及以香港作跳板拓展海外市場而日趨強勁的內地企業需求，令本港租金和寫字樓價格屢創新高。

然而，以上理由亦同樣適用於零售樓宇：不斷增加的內地旅客豈不是也在對零售物業產生巨大的需求？爲何寫字樓卻能在供應上作出更大的回應，大幅拋離零售樓面增長？

消費模式轉變：從商品到服務

筆者認爲，寫字樓存量增速高於零售空間或與香港經濟結構的變化有關——越來越多的消費行為轉為在服務領域進行，而非單純局限與商品交易這層面上。對比三十多年來的表現，服務業開支的增長大大高於和零售金額：兩者比例由80年代的0.9倍增至21世紀初的2.5倍（【圖二】橫軸）。同時，似乎寫字樓與零售樓宇的存量之比也有對應的增長（縱軸）。除了在過去四至五年中，服務對零售消費比例出現短暫的波動之外（或是因爲內地遊客於數年間激增所致），兩組比例幾乎呈完美的綫性關係。

圖二：服務消費比重上升帶動寫字樓存量跑贏零售物業 

若由私人消費開支角度來看，可見服務類別的消費比重由1981年的43%增加至現在的60%；而不少服務類的消費主要就是在寫字樓內生產製造，甚至同時在寫字樓內消費掉。在同一時期內，需要更多零售空間作支援的食品和消費物品所佔比重由58%下降至47%（見【表】）。

表：私人消費開支：服務類比重越見上升

上述服務消費增加的趨勢更詳細地於【圖三】中呈現出來。反過來看，用於統計通貨膨脹數據所用的住戶開支籃子成份同時也可見到零售貨品比重下降的跡象（零售物品包括食物、飲料、衣物和耐用物品，見【圖四】紫線）。

圖三：服務佔私人消費開支比重愈來愈大 

   

圖四：實體貨品在通脹籃子中比重在大幅下跌

從實體到虛擬、由線下至線上

近年另一個新趨勢則是網上零售的爆炸性增長【圖5】，這意味著零售行銷會有越來越多在寫字樓（如電子商務工作人員經手網上購物）和工業或倉儲樓宇（為網上購物的物流部分提供支援）進行，而不佔用傳統的零售樓面。此趨勢對未來寫字樓或零售空間的需求會有更加舉足輕重的影響。

圖五：上網購物的港人數目（百萬）大幅攀升 

為何寫字樓租金仍未高於零售業樓宇？

既然服務業的增長更為強勁，那為何寫字樓租金並無顯著跑贏零售樓宇租金【圖六】？一個較簡單的解釋可能是寫字樓供應量增長亦同時大於零售樓宇，故而削弱了寫字樓租金的上升優勢。由空間角度去解釋，因為寫字樓的樓面可以堆疊於多層大廈內而不影響其實用性，但是零售物業需要人流量大、交通方便、及醒目當眼的地段方為零售商青睬，因此多層商廈中的零售樓層一般都局限在最低幾樓（通常不過三），這在某種程度上使零售樓面較寫字樓稀缺，租金亦較後者為高。

圖六：過去廿年寫字樓租金跑贏零售，但在絕對值上仍有距離  

那麼未來的發展會是怎樣呢？寫字樓的供應量會繼續領先零售樓宇嗎？答案是未必。因為：一）隨著內地遊客數量回升並創新高，更多獨特主題的多層購物中心將會落成甚至由寫字樓宇改建而成；二）移動／共用辦公和無固定辦公桌的新辦公方式可以減少員工人均寫字樓面積（有企業預計轉向無固定辦公桌和共用空間能減低多於一成樓面需求），更遑論機器人的出現可能對職業白領帶來的威脅及造成的相應寫字樓需求量的減少。

無論未來怎樣發展，香港應能保持其區域總部及購物天堂的地位，而本港亦將繼續受惠於亞洲較高速的整體經濟增長。因此，本港寫字樓及零售樓面的長線表現都應該會優於其他國際城市之相應板塊。

筆者特別鳴謝香港中文大學學生賴子萱對此文的貢獻。