2019年9月17日星期二

20190914 iMoney 封面故事_Cover Story 最壞時刻剛開始

本文為簡短版,載于iMoney
部分内容請見原文1, 原文2

過去3 個月,社會運動不斷,中美貿易戰升溫,本港經濟明顯轉差,備受內外負面因素夾擊的樓市已現疲態,樓價回軟。中原城市領先指數(CCL)最新報184.96 點,較6 月底的歷史高位190.48 點,目前樓價已回落約近3%。新盤開價明顯變得保守,不少二手放盤業主急急減價賣樓,大型屋苑劈價百萬元成交已成常態。特首上周宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂後,股市大幅反彈,二手交投也回升。

最近港府再積極力增土地供應,市傳港府正考慮引用《收回土地條例》徵收土地用作興建公營房屋,一手空置稅也於周五(13 日)刊憲。另一方面,銀行頻頻出手調減樓按優惠,樓市充斥好淡因素,祥益地產總裁汪敦敬指政治事件仍會影響樓價走勢,估計至農曆年底前樓價會再跌5% 至10%。而Bricks & Mortar Management 主席兼總裁王震宇又言樓市最壞情況只是剛開始。


今年初時,多間大行分析員一面倒轉軚看好樓市,有「星級地產分析員」之稱的Bricks & Mortar Management 主席兼總裁王震宇,卻維持看淡樓市,提醒市場經濟已現轉差的情況。最後樓市如他所料,過去數月樓市不利因素愈來愈多。是次王震宇接受本刊訪問,維持看淡樓市的預測,指中美貿易戰下,中國出口遷移至東南亞國家,本港的轉口利潤難免受害,失業率在明年更有可能上升至6%,更揚言樓市最壞時刻只要剛開始。

獨立關稅區重中之重

 

過去數月社會持續動盪,特首林鄭月娥上周四(5 日)宣布正式撤回修訂《逃犯條例》,市場憧憬樓市氣氛有望回暖,但王震宇坦言此舉對樓市完全沒有正面支持作用,「港人的信心不會因為撤回《逃犯條例》就可恢復,現在的情況是整體政治環境已急速向下。香港表面上可能是個有獨立關稅、擁獨立法治的城市,但實際上已變了質,不管是撤回《逃犯條例》與否,人們對香港已失去信心。」不過,他不排除當政治事件在之後得到解決,樓市氣氛會突然回升,但他提醒不能忽略整體經濟大環境轉差的因素。「從信心的層面來說,香港自1997 年後也沒有出現過現在那樣差的情況,這對營商環境來說是一個很大的打擊。」

「短期來說,經濟對樓市的影響絕對是大於政治上,現在的經濟開始差,對樓市的影響很大。」王震宇指,即使香港數個月前沒有出現示威,全球經濟在去年開始已出現向下的情況,其中香港在中美貿易角力及反送中浪潮下,經濟面對更大的下行風險。他表示,自上世紀八十年代中國改革開放,香港逐漸成為中方出入口貿易上重要的轉口港,就算香港回歸後,美國認為香港仍享高度自治而讓本港獨立關稅區地位得以保留,因此香港享有比內地較低的關稅,中國經香港出口貿易總額更急速上升,大大超越本地生產總值,近年更達到本地生產總值的145%,足見獨立關稅區地位對香港經濟之重要性。

據王震宇的研究,香港因轉口貿易而所獲利潤亦佔本地生產總值約14%,加上貿易及批發相關的就業人數(不包括零售),已佔本港就業人口的18%,可見依靠香港獨立關稅地位而生存的經濟板塊着實不小;如再計入零售業就業人數,本港28%的就業人數(約79 萬人)是靠這一本港獨特的政治身份維持生計。

本港失業率或升愈倍

 

隨着中美貿易戰久久未解決,愈來愈多內地企業將出口轉至東南亞國家,王震宇估計,如中國出口的五分之一因貿戰而遷移至東南亞國家,東南亞出口至美國貨物量的比重可能暴漲至中國的出口貨物量的72%;而香港超過50% 的轉口貨物都是以中國為來源地,本港的轉口利潤難免受害,每年損失兩個百分點的GDP 貢獻。屆時本地就業亦將受害,以非經濟學角度去簡單推算,兩成的生意跌幅,若導致兩成的從業員失業,本港失業率在2020 年底時, 有可能上升3.6 個百分點至6.6 厘,如屆時出口跌20%,失業率不排除會升至8.44%(現為2.9%)。

王震宇續稱,就算是只計入是外圍環境轉差,以及中國將出口南移至東南亞國家這兩大因素,已有將本港失業率推至沙氏期高位的殺傷力。若香港失去獨立關稅地位,連轉口這個
飯碗也「打爛」,這因素已可毀滅性地令佔勞動人口18% 的貿易批發業大量失業。因此,他強調這次經濟風暴實在不可小覷。

樓價兩年內或跌20%

 

受到本地政治事件影響,王震宇認為本港「走資潮」已經出現,他指出,過去20 年香港的住宅成交中,有約20% 由內地人購入,當這批內地人發現香港環境出現「勢頭不對」的情況,便會拋售賣樓,對本港樓市而言是個很大的衝擊。綜合以上各大因素,他認為樓市最壞的情況只是剛開始出現。

對於樓價走勢,他直言「好難估」,「為受政策因素影響,如樓價下跌一至兩成,不排除港府會突然出招,或將按揭成數升至七成至九成,樓市一定會回復;但這些都是由人為控制的因素,故較難估計。」不過,他相信樓價於未來一至兩年跌10% 至20%,是「絕無問題」。

王震宇指,未來可能會有更多發展商以低於二手價推出新盤,對於未來是否合適入市時機,他認為要視乎個人的情況及能力,「如果遇到平價盤,準買家有足夠的收入,也有需要的,而且不是以投資為目的,可即管『去馬』,當買入一件資產自用。」但他指,其實投資房地產並不需要一定在香港,「我也有幫客人物色海外物業,如英國、新加坡物業,當然要足功課。」








為自保同胞拋售 不問價港樓更傷

載於2019年9月17日信報

完整版如下:
上文(見獨立地位成疑 經濟前景堪憂)分析本港因中美貿易戰或失去獨立關稅地位而可能出現的經濟不景狀況,本文則由內地人拋售本港物業角度去預測樓市可能出現的走資潮

港樓已成大陸富豪資產配置要素

大陸同胞在香港買樓投資源遠流長,但是有系統地紀錄及量化此一現象則近至2007年方由中原開始著手。從2007年第一季到2018年第四季間,內地買家在高峰期曾掃入多至42%之一手單位(【圖一】藍線),且因以豪宅居多,金額佔比更高達51%(【圖二】藍線)。不過,由整體市場來看,2011年最高峰期內地買家則只佔15%宗數及26%金額,可見新樓對其吸引力較二手單位高出數倍:

圖一:私人住宅內地買家宗數比例2011年見頂
圖二:私人住宅內地買家金額曾高達整體四分之一
就算在各項辣招推出後,2018年尾整體成交中仍有8%的買家是南下的同胞(金額:12%),可見本港樓市對中國富豪的吸引力是何等巨大。究其原因,必包含本港資金自由,法制完善,制度可信等等。
兩制岌岌 走資連連?
以上香港制度上的優越性,可能已因反送中事件及可能出現的後續發展,而令人對本港保護私人財產之能力產生不可驅散的長遠憂慮。例如,《刑事互助條例》可令任何在港人士之資產直被中國凍結;不難想像,未來內地富豪大有可能不單止停買入本港物業,甚至開始大手拋售手持的資產以作避險,形成新一輪的走資潮。

回望2014年雨傘運動後,內地買家在港買入物業的意欲大跌,由2014年第三季到2016年第一季,每季成交金額由135億急降六成至約54億(見【圖三】左面紅箭咀)。今輪社會反彈力度更為激烈,預示香港營商環境所面對的威脅亦更危急;可以肯定,未來數月內地買家的成交金額將下跌不止一條紅箭咀,甚至有可能跌穿雨傘運動後的低位(見【圖三】下面綠虛線),即近八成跌幅!

圖三:私人住宅內地買家金額可能大跌八成
圖四:私人住宅內地買家可能出現的買賣宗數變
如要量化走資趨勢,須為淨買入(或賣出)數量作出推算;筆者設下兩個情景:

一)樂觀假設:與雨傘運動後走勢相若,即買入量下跌一半而賣出量持平(分別為【圖四】中藍虛線及紅虛線);

二)悲觀假設:買入量跌九成兼賣出量雙倍於近年高位(分別為【圖四】中藍點虛線及紅點虛線)。

紅藍線之差表示淨買入/賣出量,樂觀情況下內地人仍會買入本港物業多於賣出(【圖四】淺橙區),但悲觀情況下則很快見到拋售潮出現(【圖四】深橙區),即每季淨出貨達1,800宗,約為二手成交之六分之一。更大的問題是,在淨拋售潮出現後,是否再度會回復正常,還是江河日下,再出現崩堤式「擠提」?

走資金額千億計 最壞情況人踩人

以上從買賣宗數分析,然而要看對樓價影響的力度,非由賣盤的市值入手不可。自2007年起,內地買家所購入的物業淨累積金額(以現今市值計價)已高達7,240億(見【圖五】淺紅區),相當於2018年全年私樓成交量的1.3倍!而且本文只看住宅還未包括工商舖類別的物業。

如以上拋售潮出現,則在樂觀情況下,內地買家的淨持貨量仍可大致持平(見【圖五】淺橙區);但若悲觀情況成真,內地買家可能在一兩年間沽出2,710億的資產(見【圖五】深橙區),即去年成交量的一半。此還未計及因大量的買家走資,導致羊群效應而產生的恐慌性拋售……

圖五:內地買家累積金額—多達7千億沽貨壓力


至於數量方面,由2007年累積至今,內地業主累積買入4萬6千個物業(見【圖六】淺紅區)。以上文悲觀情況計算,未來兩三年可能有1萬9千個單位被內地業主放售,與未來兩年之預測年均落成量相若。如此龐大的沽壓可對本港樓價帶來不小的震盪。

圖六:內地業主累積數目可能回到2012年水平?

若果全退 威力更巨

下圖估算的悲觀情況是筆者之假設(即買家跌九成,沽家升一倍),然而若因政治局勢導致解放軍出動,又或是美國取消香港獨立關稅地位,則最壞的情況可能是所有內地富豪雞飛狗走,「全退」去星加坡或其他西方城市避險。內地買家所拋售的單位數目將以倍數上升(由【圖七】及【圖八】之橙條跳至紅條),光是二手成交,可能需要13個月方能全部消化。由金額角度看,所需時間更再倍升至28個月!(見【圖七】及【圖八】中藍點)

圖七:若內地業主全退,需13月成交消化
圖八:金額計全退威力更大,需28月方吸納

本文分析內地買家,因為彼等來港投資,全因本港獨特的地位。但當來港的原因消失,他必會毫不遲疑地沽貨走人,與香港業主有居住需要大大不同。而在二手市場有兩年半成交金額相當的沽盤出現時,樓價下插的幅度將會難以估計,慘烈程度必大於97一役。

《逃犯條例》雖已確定撤回,但全世界已經對香港的自由制度優勢產生懷疑。未來政府實在不宜作出不利香港形象的舉措,否則走資潮湧現,打殘香港經濟和樓市,受害者必會包括走避不及的內地資本。

筆者特別鳴謝香港大學學生林朗晞協助收集及整理本文相關的數據及圖表。

2019年9月16日星期一

Doubts over “One Country Two Systems” to spark an emigration surge?

Posted on 13th September, 2019 Stand News ,

As discussed in earlier analysis (see How low will Carrie Lam's popularity fall? And HK's freedom ranking with it?, and its follow-up Carrie Lam - a most dramatic turn from 'Dream of reconciliation' to 'Nightmare of oppression'), the steady erosion of the public’s perception of freedom in Hong Kong may have reached a dangerous level as to impact their confidence to remain in the city for the long term. This alarming development will be analysed in the rest of this article in the context of trends in emigration figures and how this is impacted by the latest political developments.

One of the potential side effects of the extradition bill affair may be the United States revoking the US-HK Policy Act as a response to the perceived impingement of Hong Kong’s promised autonomy. The Act, passed in 1992, allows the US to treat Hong Kong separately from Mainland China on matters of trade and economics, provided Hong Kong is “sufficiently autonomous” to justify special treatment. If Hong Kong loses its privilege of being an “independent customs zone”, dire economic consequences could await the city – an aspect to be explored in a subsequent article.

Protests stoking emigration intent to record highs

Hong Kong may be about to witness over the next few years the biggest emigration rush since 1984. One of the best ways to quantify interest in emigration is tracking Google Trends through search frequency for the term “emigration” (in Chinese: “移民”):

Chart 1: Sharp spike in “移民” (“emigration”) Google search frequency


In the wake of the government’s tabling the extradition bill in May, search frequency doubled compared to end of 2018, and continued to rise in June as mass demonstrations persisted, then doubling again from May levels when street conflicts broke out in July.From the chart above, there seems to be a notable correlation between the various political events in Hong Kong and people’s interest in emigration:

a) After the government shelved the article 23 legislation which triggered the biggest demonstrations since handover, search frequency began a steady increase despite a strong rebound in property prices and the local economy. By the time CY Leung took office in July 2012 the reading was up 40% (see blue channel in Chart 1);

b) The umbrella movement triggered a second wave of interest in emigration, seeing search interest double by end-2018, indicating a further rattling of confidence in Hongkongers’ outlook for their own future (see green channel in Chart 1);

c) The anti-extradition bill saga has not yet ended, but interest in emigration exploded higher already, doubling from end-18 levels, and entering a much steeper new trajectory (see the red channel in Chart 1)!

Of course, search engine frequencies must not be conflated with the actual permanent outflow of residents. Perhaps not surprisingly, there seems to be a correlation between Public Sentiment Index (PSI) readings, a measure of government approval, to real emigration numbers from Hong Kong: in other words, low government approval ratings leads to higher emigration growth rates in subsequent years:


Chart 2: Arrows suggest likely rises on the number of emigrants?


It seems entirely possible that the recent collapse in the public’s confidence in the government could drive a quantum leap in the coming years in increased emigration numbers (similar to the jump from A to B after the Sino-British Joint Declaration, in Chart 2 above), and this time we might see a surge above an otherwise modest increase to D up to the 1984 peak levels – if not even higher – at E in the chart.

Emigration numbers following the Sino-British Joint Declaration doubled from 20,000 levels in 1984 to 40,000 in 1988, and then up another fold to a record high of 65,000 by 1992 (Chart 3). Today’s political events may lead even more people to flee from the erosion of the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement in Hong Kong. A repeat of the 1980s emigration wave could easily see numbers rapidly rise from a few thousands of the past few years to tens of thousands witnessed during the prior peaks:

Fig 3: Emigration could jump to 90s record highs, if not above

Where do emigrating Hongkongers head for?

Chart 4 shows some of the most popular destinations of Hong Kong emigrants. The common characteristics of these locations include language spoken being English or Chinese, and a high degree of personal freedoms – all top 20 placed on personal freedom index rankings according to The Fraser Institute (except the USA).

Taiwan’s freedom rankings have seen major advances, jumping from outside the top-40 to 15th place in merely eight years, edging ahead of even the UK in the past two years (green line in Chart 4). As Taiwan’s personal freedom index ranking rose, its share of HK emigrants rose too, going from 6% in 2008 to 17% in 2017. If the relationship between a migration destination’s freedom and its popularity continues to hold, Taiwan will soon be amongst the top five destinations of Hong Kong emigration:

Chart 4: higher the personal freedom ranking, more HKer inflows?

Hong Kong’s ‘arch-opponent’ for the title of Asia’s premier financial centre, Singapore, should not be written off as a magnet for HK emigrants either. Although the Lion City still trails Hong Kong in the freedom rankings as of now, the dynamics have changed significantly over the past five years which saw Hong Kong fall 10 places, as Singapore rise by a massive 18 places in the rankings (blue line vs orange line in Chart 5). If current trends persist, Singapore could overtake HK in a very short period of time indeed:

Chart 5: HK’s personal freedoms in freefall, left behind by Taiwan in 2015. Singapore next to overtake?



Our earlier article discussed the real possibility of Hong Kong’s personal freedom ranking falling outside top-40 in 2019. But this is not the only indicator of a destination’s desirability, another useful barometer may be how popular a destination is with the wealthy global elite, whose movements provide the most honest vote of their intentions:

Table 1: Movements of the global wealthy in 2018











Source:Global Wealth Migration Review 2018 from AfrAsia Bank and New World Wealth
*Net HNWI inflows / HNWIs in receiving country
**Net HNWI outflows / HNWIs in sending country

The Global Wealth Migration Review 2018 (GWMR 2018) describes that when considering a destination, the global wealthy primarily consider factors such as safety, economic stability, freedom, and political stability. Table 1 suggests that countries with a net loss of wealthy individuals such as Turkey, Russia and China are those which lack these desired attributes. One anomaly in the table is the UK, whose rare net outflow of high net worth individuals may be explained by Brexit uncertainties and recent draconian tax laws that hit the wealthy particularly hard.

After the current anti-extradition turmoils, Hong Kong will no doubt lose some of its wealthy residents. The GWMR estimates Hong Kong’s wealthy to number some 235,700 in 2018, amounting to 3% of the total population. If migration rates do swell to peak levels seen in the 1980s, reducing the territory’s highly skilled individuals by 60,000 a year, Hong Kong will stand to lose the most productive and the brightest talent to foreign countries, much to the detriment of its long term prosperity.

The author would like to thank Shaun Cheung of The University of Hong Kong for assisting in data collection, analysis, and drafting this article.


















2019年9月5日星期四

獨立地位成疑 經濟前景堪憂

本文簡短版載於2019年9月5日信報
全篇文章如下:

上文(見一國兩制受損 移民熱情升溫?)提到,香港近年自由度下跌,除了影響市民留港發展的信心,更會令香港貿易伙伴重新審視香港的自治狀態。本篇將分析本港自由貿易港地位在經濟層面的重要性,包括中美貿易角力及反送中浪潮下本港經濟發展所面對的下行風險。

轉口貿易存在 全賴獨立地位
香港自上世紀八十年代因爲中國改革開放而逐漸成爲中方出入口貿易上重要的轉口港,回歸後亦因美國認爲香港仍享高度自治而讓本港獨立關稅區地位得以保留,並享有比内地較低的關稅。因此,中國製造業亦得以利用本港此一優勢而避免支付龐大的關稅。自2001年中國加入世界貿易組織開始,中國經香港出口貿易總額更急速飆升【圖一紅線】,大大超越本地生產總值,近年更達到本地生產總值的145%【圖一藍區】,可見獨立關稅區地位對香港經濟之重要性。

       圖一:香港的出口貿易額早於1992年已超越本地生產總值


上圖可見,香港因為是中國和世界貿易一個重要的中間人,令轉口貿易佔香港出口貿易總額達99%,至本地生產總值的1.45倍【圖二黃區加綠區】。因轉口貿易而所獲利潤亦佔本地生產總值約14%,加上貿易及批發相關的就業人數(不包括零售)佔本港就業人口18%【圖三紅虛線】,可見依靠香港獨立關稅地位而生存的經濟板塊著實不小!如計入零售業就業人數,則本港79萬人(28%)靠這一本港獨特的政治身份吃飯,較星加坡相同類別就業人數之16%更形重要【圖三紅線及綠線】。

           圖二:轉口利潤仍佔本地生產總值兩成之多

           圖三:貿易為香港創造大量的就業機會

大陸仍需香港作轉口站

香港貿易主要靠內地不言自喻,但是中國既有發達港口,低廉勞力,卻仍然有11%的出口要經本港,而經香港入口的貨值更佔總量15%之多【表一】,可見本港獨立關稅地位仍然對中國有甚大的重要性(特別是戰略性商品及物資),否則為何不由珠三角其他港口經手?

表一:中國仍有雙位數之貿易經香港出入
然而,近月香港出現反送中示威,更持續發酵,引起國際關注,其中美國更考慮重新審視香港因行使高度自治權而享有的獨立關稅地位,正討論訂立新的《香港人權及民主法案》;若證明香港不再享有高度自治時,美國政府可以取消給予香港在經濟貿易上的特別待遇。

如香港失去獨立關稅區的地位,中國便再不能透過香港作為中轉站,不但令自己出口失去那11%經香港避了關稅的好處(兼造就廠商加速外移),亦隨時再不能經本港入口西方會限制直接輸往大陸的商品,實是雙輸之局面!


中美貿易戰雪上加霜
另一方面,中美貿易戰正亦打得如火如荼,當更多中國入口美國的商品被加徵關稅前,已有不少製造商遷移在大陸的生產線。光是較出名的品牌,已星光熠熠,受惠的地區以台灣及東南亞國家為主:

表二:國際知名高科技品牌遷離大陸報導

且看美國經東南亞入口貨品與中國入口之趨勢,東南亞貨源比例於2013年開始上升,2019年更突破運行區間頂部,創出新高(見【圖四】紅線);雖然歐盟自東盟入口的比例上升速度較緩,但仍然穩步爬升,2018年亦見37%之比(見【圖五】紅線)。此一趨勢亦對香港作為亞洲金融/貿易樞紐的地位有所威脅,因為本來經港處理的物流及技術,以後或會越來越傾向由星加坡經手。

圖四:中國及東盟出口往美國之貨品價值

圖五:中國及東盟出口往歐盟貨品價值

至於中美貿易戰所造成的影響,實難量化,以下只以較籠統兩個假設來分析:一)中港出口跌一成;及二)出口少去兩成。

如中國出口的五分之一因貿戰而遷移至東南亞國家,東南亞出口至美國貨物量的比重可能暴漲至中國的出口貨物量72%之比【圖六紅點虛線】。由於香港超過50%的轉口貨物都是以中國為來源地,本港的轉口利潤難免受害,每年損失兩個百分點的GDP貢獻【圖七紅點虛線】:

圖六:貿易戰下東盟受惠

圖七:悲觀假設:本港轉口自中國貿易可跌回2012年水平

本地就業亦將受害,以非經濟學角度去簡單推算,兩成的生意跌幅若導致兩成的從業員失業,那本港失業率有可能上升3.6個百分點(18.1%-14.5%,見【圖八紅點虛線】)?

以上論述還未計入環球經濟已經進入衰退邊緣,只看本港採購經理指數,已可預見本港失業率將於2020年上半年抽升兩個百分點的可能【圖九紅箭嘴】。當本港已經被環球經濟失速和貿戰令廠商出走南亞這兩大負面因素夾擊,實在難以承受失去獨立關稅地位,連轉口這當家飯碗也被打爛的風險。

圖八:貿戰將打擊就業

圖九:PMI預視失業率將攀升

就算不計失去獨立關稅地位(因轉口佔總出口99%,可毀滅性地一舉令佔勞動人口18%的貿易批發業大量失業),光是外圍及南移兩大因素,已有將本港失業率推至沙士期高位的殺傷力【圖十】。今趟經濟風暴,實在不可小覷。

圖十:香港失業率會上升多少?

筆者特別鳴謝香港大學經濟學系學生周柏希協助收集及整理本文相關的數據及圖表。

2019年9月4日星期三

Will Shenzhen be the new Hong Kong?

In the wake of the recent Hong Kong protests, China announced an initiative to upgrade Shenzhen into a model of "high-quality development, an example of law and order and civilisation, as well as societal satisfaction and sustainability", raising speculation this to be a backup plan to position Shenzhen as the replacement Hong Kong.

This is something we do not expect to happen for quite a few years yet. And the FT's Lex column [see Hong Kong v Shenzhen: Central casting] agrees, saying that multinational companies will simply move their headquarters to Singapore:

"...Shenzhen lacks too many basics for multinationals to consider a move. There are concerns about the fairness and transparency of the legal system. The Chinese yuan is not convertible. Free movement of capital is not allowed. Even Chinese internet giant Tencent, which has its headquarters in Shenzhen, is listed in Hong Kong."

"Hong Kong’s higher credit rating and the special trading status granted under the US-Hong Kong Policy Act are big advantages. US tariffs do not apply to Hong Kong. China’s free trade zones have fallen short of expectations. Surveillance on foreign companies is increasing. Censorship is a concern."

"Singapore remains the only sensible alternative for more than 1,500 multinational companies in Hong Kong. For now, the main advantage Shenzhen has as a city is easy access to Hong Kong. Its understudy position is underlined rather than undercut by the recent surge in air traffic."

This echoes our comments on why loss of freedom in HK could lead to mass emigration [see here] as well as capital flight (article coming). In fact looking at China's various other Free Trade Zone (FTZ) initiatives of recent years, none of them seem to have undermined HK's position, and for similar reasons the FT cited above, for example:

- Shanghai FTZ, launched in 2013, targeting at becoming "an international financial centre by 2020", has seen banks exiting due to capital controls (source: Reuters);

- Qianhai Special Economic Zone, established in 2012, targeting at becoming "a key services centre in APAC district, playing a vital role in modern global services arena, and an important base for global services trade by 2020", may have now been absorbed into the even more ambitious Greater Bay Area initiative (source: Wiki).

All of this tells us that instead of worrying about Shenzhen, HK must preserve its current free and independent legal and governance infrastructure if it is to compete with Singapore for global business and talent. Once it loses its core values, HK will become just another second-tier Chinese city with half the land area and population of Shenzhen.