2017年11月9日星期四

TVB Interview / 專訪—日日有樓睇‧樓市把脈 20171108




Above is a recent feature interview by Hong Kong's TVB channel, in which we highlighted the following key issues facing the local housing market:
a) with the end of the USD correction in October, HK dollar assets will face headwinds;

b) higher than market expected interest rates are likely in the coming year, putting more pressure on housing assets in HK;

c) current government policies to encourage home ownership will likely result in the weakest segment of the society ending up in negative equity when the housing cycle turns down;

d) the best way to address the high prices is to convert all public housing supplies into private market supplies. By shifting supply into public housing, the government is directly pushing up home prices as supply is diverted into the non-buying portions of the housing ladder;

e) the government is setting too high income thresholds and keeps raising them (eg PRH threshold now covers 43% of HK households, HOS threshold is higher than 78% of HK households, while the Green Form Subsidised Home Ownership Scheme extends over 86% of all HK households). This creates a false impression of ever rising demand for housing welfare, when the proper way to restrict demand is to lower the thresholds so only the truly needy will qualify to join the waiting lists.

以上采訪出自香港無綫電視專訪,其中筆者指出了本地樓市存在的一些關鍵的問題:

a)現時樓價向下的風險較向上風險大,由於美金剛完成調整,現在開始反彈,因此港元資產會趨向走弱;

b)環球息率向上會多於市場預期,也會增加樓市風險;

c)現時樓價已經接近頂端,而政府推出的各項鼓勵市民置業的政策卻鼓勵最無承受力的市民在樓價下跌時淪爲負資產;

d)針對樓價高企的最好政策,莫過於將公營房屋土地全部撥入私人市場,政策過度傾斜公營房屋會為樓價火上加油,因爲供應被轉往不能影響市價的板塊;

e)政府所定的公營房屋入息限額過高也會令樓市升溫(例如:公屋入息限額已經覆蓋四成三家庭,居屋入息限額已經覆蓋七成八家庭,而綠置居入息更覆蓋高達八成六住戶) 這造成了福利房屋需求强勁的假象--更正確的做法應該降低公營房屋入息門檻以服務真正有需要的市民。

2017年9月28日星期四

財務策劃會議 各界翹楚獻策

載於信報2017年9月28日



筆者早前獲邀參與財務策劃會議論論壇,與各位財金官員及金融業翹楚擔任演講嘉賓。
施永青先生跟筆者均認為現時香港的樓價已經偏高,並非合適入市之時機,鑑於香港仍擁有太多存款,樓價因此未能下跌。

同時筆者亦在論壇表示若美國縮表及加息步伐加快,將成為明年推動樓市下跌其中一個主因。


2017年9月1日星期五

Time to Duck when celebs Quack?

It appears that the Hong Kong property market is reaching a fever pitch of late, with a string of news on record high prices being achieved. However, there is an ‘entertaining’ twist to this phenomenon, in that more and more entertainers (ie movie stars, singers) are reported to be buying properties – indeed, year to date this group of buyers have acquired over HK$1bn worth of bricks and mortar, involving over 44,000 square feet of space (Table 1):

Table 1: property purchases by celebrities in 2017
Source: media reports

One should not simply draw conclusions about any significant trends just because a particular group of people are behaving en masse. However, one should surely delve deeper when any phenomenon starts to exhibit extreme patterns – this article looks into the extraordinary symptom of celebrity purchases to aid readers in their own property decisions.

Celebs often seen buying when markets are hottest

Whether or not the property market is overvalued or a good buy depends on how far from longer term trends the price is at any point in time. In this article the author uses Centaline index versus its 3-year moving average as an indicator of over/under valuation (see red area in Chart 1, for more immediate price action, the red line works well too). And to quantify the frequency of celebrities’ property purchases, a simple and reliable indicator might be the search frequency of the keywords ‘celebrities’ and ‘home buying’ in Google Trends (blue line in Chart 1).

Chart 1: Frequent purchases by celebrities presage home price correction ahead

One could identify from the chart above these interesting patterns:

1.      The purchase frequency of celebrities coincides with the cycle of property prices closely (it is a shame that one cannot observe the relationship back to the previous market top in 1997, as Google Trends data does not go beyond 2004)

2.      Whenever the purchase frequency of artists reached a peak, home prices would soften or even fall a year later (red line in Chart 1)

For example, in the lead up to the market top just prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, the buying frequency reached a high of 76%. This was followed shortly by the Global Financial Crisis and a 20% fall in home prices one year later. On the other hand, during the period of weak market sentiment in mid-2016 when the buying-frequency fell to a low of 42%, home prices spiked a handsome 22% in the 12 months that followed!

It pays to shadow the actions of tycoons?

Another group of market participants, also active in the Hong Kong property market, are the super-rich tycoons (represented by the blue line in Chart 2); they seem to have diametrically opposite track records compared to the artists – perhaps the tycoons have more information at their finger-tips, or because they act on purely profit motive (rather than to follow the heart), they seem to have a highly profitable outcome in their dealings:

Chart 2: Tycoon sales seem to be followed by drops in home prices a year later

It is possible to identify two sets of patterns from the above chart:

1.      Fluctuations of tycoon property sales also coincide closely with the home price cycle;
2.      Home prices tended to correct or fall when more tycoons dispose of their properties (red line in Chart 2)

As an illustration, at the same time the celebs (i.e artists) were buying big time in 2008, the frequency of disposals by tycoons was also at its highest (when the reading reached a maximum of 100% in the series). Then in early 2016, when tycoon sale frequency fell to a low of 45%, home prices increased smartly in the year that followed. Crucially important for readers to note is the fact that the tycoon sale frequency has surged to 98% in recent months once again…

Subdivide-and-dump and hiving-off work well for tycoons too

Tycoons likely hold large portfolios of assets, if not listed companies holding the same in addition. They may therefore be able to lighten up their portfolios through other means than straight sales – subdividing larger properties into small units for sale, or listing on the stock exchange richly valued vehicles from their holding companies – come to mind.

If one is to search for a different set of terms on Google Trends, such as ‘hiving off’ + ‘properties’ (Chart 3 below, note the Chinese search terms used have a dual meaning of subdivision and spin-offs), one arrives at the same price reaction as the ‘tycoon’ + ‘sell properties’ terms analysed above. Putting the two sets of search combinations together, they indeed exhibit almost identical profile (see Chart 4).

Chart 3: Tycoons hiving off their assets also bode ill for property prices

Chart 4: Tycoons selling have near identical timing as artists/celebs buying

If the magnitude of change in home prices follows the red arrow in Chart 3, there is significant risk to the sustainability of housing market in the months ahead. Readers should exercise even more caution when considering buying homes.

Conclusion: Don’t buy from tycoons, and don’t scramble alongside artists

The above analysis yields three sets of conclusions:

1.      When big property companies increase their pace of disposals, especially subdividing or selling ever smaller units, it is often also the time when celebrities in the entertainment circles scramble to buy properties;

2.      The above phenomenon is a strong signal that the property market may be about to weaken, even collapse;

3.      Celebrities in the entertainment industry have hectic lives, and could be also more prone to acting on impulse than analysis. They could increase their chances of investment success if they employ the skills of seasoned professional advisors, both in the timing and execution of their purchases/sales, and in the ongoing management of the properties they hold. To stand better chances against the buy-high-sell-low symptom outlined above, our artists should avoid being swept off their feet by hot market sentiments, or by the sweet-talking from property agents.


The author would like to express gratitude to Mr Yeung LI of The Chinese University of Hong Kong for his contribution in the writing of this article.


2017年8月24日星期四

明星也掃貨,樓市將見頂?

載於信報2017年8月24日

近期樓市氣氛熾熱,樓王新高記錄不絕於耳,但這類新聞卻多了一重娛樂性,就是演藝界爭相入市的報道越見頻繁,單是2017年至今,明星買樓已涉資超過十億元,總樓面面積亦逾四萬呎:

表一:2017年內明星入市之個案
資料來源:各大報章


當然,只看某類買家身份之報道不足以推斷任何重要的趨勢,但當任何現象的比例開始大異於常規時,就是尋根究底的好時候。俗語有云:當鐘擺蕩向一個極端,每是趨勢轉向之時。本文就此「異象」稍作探討,希望為讀者提供多一項出入市的參考指標。

價高市旺時,娛圈入貨頻

樓市是否高風險或抵買可由樓價指數偏離較長線趨勢之幅度來判斷,本文且以中原指數對其三年移動平均線作指標,下稱「樓價-3年平均比」(【圖一】紅色片區);同時,若要量化娛樂圈入市的頻率,較方便的方法可能是於「谷歌趨勢」內搜尋相關詞語,如「明星」及「買樓」(【圖一】中藍線):

圖一:明星大舉入市,似乎預示未來樓價偏軟


從上圖可見兩個現象:

一)明星入市頻率的高低,近年多與樓價的起伏周期相吻合(谷歌數據延伸不到2004年以前,故可惜見不到上次市頂,即97年時的趨勢);

二)每當藝人買樓次數拔高,一年後樓價多出現偏軟甚至下降的情況(圖中紅線)。

08年大時代後,雷曼爆煲之前,明星買樓的頻率達到76%的高峰,但數月後金融海嘯爆發,樓市在隨後12個月大跌20%。相反地,在16年中,樓市信心疲弱之時,藝人入市比例跌至42%水平,然而其後樓價在一年間飆升22%之多!

跟大孖沙行動,勝算較高?

掉轉過來,同時亦活躍於樓市的「大孖沙」(【圖二】中藍線,非香港讀者請見維基定義:https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hk/%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%96%E6%B2%99),因掌握充分市場資訊,加上利字當頭(而非感性為先),行動果斷,往往能屢戰屢勝:

圖二:大孖沙出貨一年後,樓價多數走弱



上圖亦可看到兩個現象:
一)大孖沙出貨周期與樓市周期同樣地吻合;
二)在這些大亨大幅放售物業之後,樓價多會回調甚至下跌(圖中紅線)。
例如08年明星大舉入市的同時,亦是大孖沙出貨比例最高之際(系列最高為100%);反過來,16年初,彼等出貨率跌至45%,之後一年樓價卻節節上升。更重要的是,大孖沙出貨頻率近月已經抽升至98%水平,實在值得投資大眾留意!

拆售物業,殊途同歸
既然稱得為大孖沙,當然不是手持單位兩三隻爾,故此,無論是將物業分拆為較小單位出售,抑或由其上市公司剝離組合中資產,甚至將已上市之資產再分拆上市,都是財技高手常用之出貨策略。亦因此,若搜尋「分拆」加「物業」的頻率,其與樓價走勢之相關性應和以上「大孖沙」加「物業」加「出售」相若,如【圖三】所示。而比較兩組搜尋結果,其發生頻率及波動都大同小異,見【圖四】:

圖三:分拆物業一年後,樓價多回軟
圖四:出貨/分拆/明星入市之行為極為相近


倘若樓價變幅如【圖三】紅箭嘴所示,未來一段時間的大市展望可能不妙,欲買樓的讀者更應小心了!

總結:勿接孖沙貨,避與藝人争

以上分析可得出三個結論:

一)大財團頻頻拆售單位,尤其是「劏細」而沽,通常在時機上會遇著娛樂圈名人爭相入市(見【圖四】);

二)這現象正是樓市處於強弩之末,即將轉弱的強烈訊號;

三)明星工作忙碌,亦多為感性中人,如能委託專業人士運籌帷握、管理投資,而非跟隨傳媒風潮或中介巧舌,則以上高買低賣的宿命幾可避免爾!



筆者特別鳴謝中文大學會計系學生李洋協助收集及整理本文相關數據及圖表

2017年8月14日星期一

Have mainland home prices peaked? How reliable is official price information?

Since the start of the bull market in early 2015, the magnitude of average price rises of the 70-city basket in China has reached 30%; the trend accelerated further in early 2016 (eg. Shenzhen prices were up 16% in Q1 alone), triggering a wave of government crack down policies in Q4 2016 in an attempt to rein in the run-away prices. To date, over 20 cities have launched their versions of policies, but the impressive performance of the domestic property stocks in recent months could herald further home price increases ahead. This article attempts to look into the nature of the official statistics that stand behind these incredible price increases.

Official statistics suggest further price rises ahead

Many market commentators and analysts follow the property market in China by tracking the ‘Price Indices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings in 70 Large and Medium-Sized Cities’ published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – we will refer to this below as the official indices.


Under normal circumstances, the property market should be close to, or at a peak when the bulk of the basket cities are showing price rises (green bars in Chart 1). To illustrate, when the green bars begin to grow from the bottom (e.g. in April 2012 and April 2015), home prices usually rise, as proxied by Guangzhou (red line); on the other hand, when the green bars begin to shrink from high levels, a down-trend in property prices should also ensue (as shown in July 2011 and April 2014).

Chart 1: Official data suggest that the bull market has more to run


If one applies this relationship to the above chart, one may reach the conclusion that the current bull market in prices will continue because the green bars are still some distance from reaching the peak yet. However, the reality is not quite as straightforward as the above simple relationship suggests.

Is it the market or market statistics that local governments are trying to manage?

While gathering data for analysis, this writer has noticed a curious pattern – that whenever there is a meangingful surge in home prices, the official indices tend to lag comparable non-official ones; as shown in Chart 2, from a common starting point of 100, when steep rises in the non-official indices (red arrows) take place, the official equivalents (blue arrows) often underperform, with the blue line either remaining flat or even falling. It seems there is a mismatch between the official indicators and reality. In a short period of under eight years, the non-official index is now some 69% higher than the official index.

Chart 2: Official index always lagged behind in bull markets


Chart 3 provides another perspective on this discrepancy. Rebounds in home prices during bull markets (i.e. when the red line rises, represented by the upward sloping red arrows, e.g. from mid-2012 to mid-2013) have been accompanied by big outperformances in non-official indices vs their official equivalents (represented by rising non-red lines, which are collectively annotated by the upward blue arrows). Furthermore, this deviation happens in all the cities, and magnitudes of outperformance are not reverted during the downcycles (e.g. between late 2013 and early 2015), suggesting that the issue is not limited to isolated cases, but is a systematic aberration.

Chart 3: Non-official price index rises tend to outpace official ones 

Another intriguing observation is that how far official indices deviate from non-official indices depends on how far that city is away from the capital: while the official index of Beijing (light blue line in Chart 3), which is right under the nose of the central government, did not drift too far away from the non-official indices in the past few years, that of Tianjin (dark blue line in Chart 3), which is a bit more ‘out of sight’, was able to lag non-official readings by over 100%!

Chart 4 clearly shows the local governments’ practice of understating the substantial rises in home prices in order to avoid drawing attention or policy crackdowns from the central government.

Chart 4: The bigger the price increase (x-axis), the bigger the gap against non-official indices (y-axis)


This is understandable behaviour given the civil service performance system in China – officials’ future prospects are tied closely to the rate of GDP growth in their sphere of influence, providing great incentive for them to maximise their reported economic output. At the end of the day, gross capital formation has been major component of GDP calculations, making up 40%-50% of GDP growth (Chart 5), and in turn the housing sector with its related industries are a significant driver of capital formation. It is no wonder that local officials are tempted to grow their own housing investments as fast as possible while under-reporting this fact, because their political careers are heavily dependent on the continued boom of this sector.

Chart 5: Significant contribution of Capital Formation induces data manipulation


Once the drivers of behaviours are revealed, it is not hard to understand why the gentle rises in official indices are so inconsistent with both non-official figures, and even more at odds with news reports of soaring home prices. Tampering with official statistics may be the easiest way for local officials to produce flashy GDP figures while avoiding being accused of stoking housing bubbles!

Non-official data suggest home prices may have peaked

Given the lower reliability of the official statistics, it is perhaps more appropriate to deduce (using non-official data) the ratio of basket cities experiencing inflating home prices discussed in Chart 1. This exercise results in a picture from which one would draw an opposite conclusion on the state of the market: by as early as Q2 2016, the home prices in all of the basket cities could have already been rising. In other words, the green bars have rocketed to 100% (Chart 6) well before indicated in Chart 1, and at speeds far more rapid than the up-cycles in 2010-11 and 2013-14!



Chart 6: Non-official data suggest that home prices may have already peaked

As the green bars have already reached the top for over a year, the author fears that the housing market may soon correct, if it has not already started to do so. It is regrettable that the unreliability of official data makes it hard to diagnose the symptoms, and yet another opportunity to deflate the housing bubbles could have been missed.

To conclude, the above analysis serves as a good example to support reports that official statistics in the mainland lack robustness, and in this case, confidence in housing data may be further undermined as well. In terms of investments, readers might want to consider selling physical properties in the mainland; however, exposure to housing can be maintained by putting the proceeds in mainland property stocks, some of which still trade at reasonable valuations and have growth factors besides just the residential sub-segment.

With special thanks to Eugene Lai and Stewart Ng for their contribution to this article.