讀張維迎專訪有感：干預經濟屬「致命的自負」20250902

近日閒來閱讀，碰上一篇值得推薦的文章，視頻如下，亦附全文於尾：

   

北大張維迎﹕干預經濟屬「致命的自負」｜信報月刊專訪 

近年本港越見奉行大政府經濟政策，正是張公所批評的行政干預思維。此一現象在當今經濟疲弱之勢下，尤為顯著，當就業人口在2019移民潮開始後大幅下挫，再遇北上消費，通關後外遊等因素，令本港就業境況「見波幅，無升幅」已達四年之期： 

 

在此緊縮環境下，卻見公營部門編制屢創新高（見【橙線】），直追本港經濟最高增值板塊（金融是也；同時可見金融線亦在漸行漸低，勢頭不妙，見【紅線】）：

再以絕對值比較，原來公共行政／社會服務類別搖搖領先於2019-2025年間之增幅榜，大幅抽高4.1%；在人口和就業人數皆下跌的環境下，是否有些膨脹的感覺？儘管公務員編制微降1.4%，但相對於整體就業人口下跌6.7%的大局下，於滿街吉舖的今天（零售／飲食業人手在同時間大縮22%之巨！），似乎政府仍然瘦身未竟，須要更加努力：

 行文至此，再翻出數篇以前拙作，皆與下文理念相近，以饗讀者： 

房策萬箭齊發 樓市無所適從？

香港的士：僵化思維下之畸形生態

最低時薪要克制　經濟自由靠競爭

宇論舊文重溫：隧道補貼分流 不如乾脆免收 

張教授現為北京大學博雅特聘教授兼國家發展研究院經濟學資深教授，因其倡導自由市場及企業家精神的開創性研究而聞名。

------------------訪問原文--------------------

 2025年7月3日  

【信報月刊】干預經濟屬「致命的自負」—— 北大教授張維迎：相信企業家和市場自有出路 

 【本刊記者李俊杰】回顧歷史，人類的狂妄與自負往往帶來災難。40多年的研究讓著名經濟學家張維迎堅信，處理宏觀經濟，唯有收起致命的自負，讓企業家在市場當中試錯與成長，才能切實帶來社會創辦與進步，讓哪怕是普通百姓都能受惠，這也是他為當今中國經濟開出的藥方。今年6月初，張維迎親臨香港恒生大學接受榮譽博士學位，記者藉此機會跟他進行了一場關於中國經濟前景的訪談。

北京大學教授張維迎是中國經濟學界的市場派領軍人物，多年來著作甚豐，以思考邏輯綿密、言談豪氣干雲見稱，名場面不勝枚舉。

2016年在北京大學朗潤園跟主張政府強力介入市場的「經濟國師」林毅夫教授激辯；2017年於北京大學國家發展研究院畢業禮以《自由是一種責任》為題致詞演講；疫情期間的公開演講，也一針見血地指出企業家信心不足緣於體制及法治，全都讓人印象深刻。

市場經濟、自由、法治、企業家精神──這是他1984年在中國經濟學界嶄露頭角以來，一直主張而且捍衞的核心思想。不論是當年改革開放大潮流，還是現時國進民退苗頭漸現，這位奧地利學派經濟學家始終忠於自我認知及思考。
「無論你是官員還是科學家，也不論你有多聰明，知識都非常有限。你不要那麼狂妄，不要覺得自己無所不知。我們很渺小，所以才要市場，讓大家選擇。」時刻保持自省自覺的張維迎觀察到，過去十餘年，一種跟承認無知截然相反的自負在中國強化得比較厲害，「特別是我們加入世貿後，取得巨大經濟進步，財富增加許多，很多人回答『我們為什麼發展得這麼快？』時，傾向歸因於中國的特殊性，例如，政府較多控制經濟等等。」

致命的自負

「尤其受過一定程度教育的人，總覺得自己全盤理解社會運作，以為最優決策是一道數學公式，有標準答案，可以計算出來，『按照我的方式去做，社會就會變好』，但真實世界不是這樣的。」

張維迎借用奧地利學派宗師海耶克（Friedrich Hayek）的作品名稱《致命的自負（The Fatal Conceit）》來形容這種心態，「計劃經濟本身就是致命的自負」。他以曾被他形容為「穿着馬甲的計劃經濟」的產業政策來解釋：「產業政策利用國家政策和資金，扶持特定行業發展，當中意味着，一些人能夠看準未來要怎麼做。」

「產業政策所表現出來的集中化（投資）像中國人押寶一樣。賭注放在同一點，風險很大。近年最典型的是就是電動車和光伏產業，兩者現時均有巨大產能過剩，這很大程度是政府的政策造成。」

訪問來源：【信報月刊】

 

China - Has Home Price Bottomed Yet?

China has been on a long property cycle correction; although not the longest fall compared to the 97-03 cycle, it certainly feels like the deepest drop experienced - down 39% from the 2021 peak in Shenzhen for example:

The drop has triggered a lot of support measures in recent months, ranging from policy relaxations to rate cuts. Whilst prices are now back to 2015 levels (red line above), price-to-income ratios have seen even deeper correction - the price-to-disposable income ratio (green line above) is now back to 2007 levels, a full 18-year roundtrip! The less relevant price-to-per-capita-GDP measure has returned to 2015, similar to the price index correction (blue line).

If we looked further back to the Asian Crisis period, the drop in price-income ratios has taken us to even the 1999-2001 period. So are we near a bottom yet?

Cycle bottom near, but not there yet

The market has recently shown some signs of recovery, as the first shoots of rebound has appeared in price statistics - the latest monthly YoY numbers has registered one recovery (green bar below), after the longest period of all cities reporting drops (red bars) continuously since 2024:

Shenzhen price moves (red line above) has always been a lead indicator of national trends - each time the line turns up, the number of cities reporting price rises increase. This time however, the SZ line has not made a reversal yet, suggesting perhaps the odd city rising in the latest monthly stats is but 'counter-trend rallies' rather than trend changes...

This assessment is corroborated by stock analysts out there too, see article 1 for details. The still negative outlook is justified given still very strong global headwinds in both trade wars (article 3) and proxy hot wars, which can both flare up further. On the micro side, the inventory glut remains in need of digesting:

for more charts see here​

Both geopolitics and weak retail appetite has been weighing on China's business sentiment, which has stayed in contracting territory in Q2, following a longer period of drops for most of 2023-24:

As a result, both consumer (blue line below) and producer prices stayed neutral (at best) to negative:

The saving grace has been the aggressive rate cuts carried out by the PBoC, taking funding costs to levels significantly below HK/US levels now:

However, the pressure from rate arb is now mounting, especially when most Western nations are seeing their long bonds crash driving up rates. We don't expect this trend to end any time soon, and as a result, China's near record discount vs TBs could be due for mean reversion:

What is the bullish case?

For Shenzhen specifically, the strong momentum of Hongkongers consuming up north seem to be providing some support (article 2), and as the porosity of the SZ-HK border continue to increase, price equalisation could have some further legs to run, benefiting the prices there (more than most other cities).

The rate cuts and increasing rental yields are also tilting fundamentals in favour of owning for end users, and buying for investors. The negative yield gap (currently around 2%, see blue lines below) for home owners however could recover more before buying demand returns in numbers:

As a result, we expect likely another 100-200bps of narrowing - either from rental growth or further rate cuts - before prices begin recovering meaningfully. The timing seems to be more likely 2027 on current trajectories from the chart above.

=====================Article 1====================

Goldman Sachs Says China Home Prices May Drop 10% Before 2027 Market Bottom

2025/06/26 | Iris Hong

China’s property slump could extend into 2027 with a further 10 percent decline in home prices, as policymakers remain cautious about easing measures, according to a Goldman Sachs report released on Wednesday.

[…]

https://www.mingtiandi.com/real-estate/research-policy/goldman-sachs-says-china-home-prices-may-drop-another-10/​

​

=====================Article 2====================

Benefits of Shenzhen/Hong Kong tourism mainly flow one way

2025/06/12

[…]

While Hong Kong tourists travel north to take advantage of cheaper hotels and restaurants, Mainland tourists arriving from Shenzhen are more inclined to take short trips and focus on sightseeing rather than shopping and restaurants. Shenzhen has now overtaken Macau as the most popular weekend destination for Hong Kong residents.

[…]

​https://www.savills.com/prospects/cities-benefits-of-shenzhen-hong-kong-tourism-mainly-flow-one-way.html​

=====================Article 3====================

Trump Says He'll Set 50 Percent Tariff on Copper

2025/07/08

[…]

“Today, we’re doing copper,” Trump said at a July 8 Cabinet meeting in front of reporters. “I believe the tariff on copper, we’re going to make it 50 percent.”

[…]

​https://www.theepochtimes.com/business/trump-to-impose-50-percent-tariff-on-copper-5884328

 

【Metro Radio】 新城財經台 新城地產街 20250712

  載於2025年07月12日 【Metro Radio 新城地產街】 

主題: 

》資金流向情況如何？是否有資金回流中港兩地？

》近日氣氛好轉，拆息回落，銀行按揭現金回贈增加，目前樓價見底未？資金有否流入房產市場？

》目前公私營房屋比例七三比，有關比例應否作出轉變？當中基於那些因素考慮？應否增加私樓的比例？

》全年樓價走勢？投資策略部署？股匯債比例？

主持: 林潔瑩

新城連結

【胡‧說樓市】樓市展望：聯繫匯率，港元脫鉤，債務危機 20250519

   2025年5月19日

主題:

》今年首季差估署私樓樓價指數跌幅放緩，請問樓市是否開始見底? 自住買家/投資者是否可以入市?

》資金從美元資產外流，對比不斷下調的定存利率，本港物業是否已有足夠投資吸引力?

發展商減價出貨的取態，對市場有沒有帶來什麼影響？二手業主會否受制於新盤市場？會怎樣看二手市場的前景？銀行是否願意估足價、願意放貸是這批業主的最大考慮，你會怎樣評估現時銀行借貸的取態？

》地緣政治的衝突風險是否仍然存在? 

》關稅戰暫緩，但市場對美國衰退的憂慮未減，特朗普雖然放話鮑威爾減息，但聯儲局目前正面對滯脹及財政懸崖的難題，未來利率走向如何? 可以從債息的走勢看到嗎? 背後的理據是甚麼?

訪問來源：【胡。說樓市】

wuchatprop.com.hk

特此鳴謝

主持: 胡國威

攝影，剪接及製作: 陳迪麟，胡。說樓市團隊

Argentina: time to invest after 100 years of socialism/fascism?

After writing extensively during our due diligence trip during Easter to this once richest country on earth, the fundamental economic numbers do point to massive turnaround from very depressed levels, but the one big question that could deter actual commitment to this as an investment target remains: Can President Milei's reforms last?

To understand whether the Milei phenomenon will last, we must look at the global geopolitical pattern at large: we are now in a gigantic anti-establishment wave that will characterise economic cycles for many years to come; and thus Milei may not be a flash in the pan phenomenon of some 'whacko academic madman' hitting a random high. Let us explain this thesis in a bit more detail:

The end of a multi-decade bureaucratic expansionary cycle?
The post-WW2 years have started a period of perhaps well intended, but centrist and interventionist governance wave, typified by deficit spending and ever bigger governments that made these charts look so absolutely lopsided:

The cancerous growth in the public sector led to, for example, too much Gerontocracy (left chart, in USA) enabling permanent politicians to make fortunes trading on insider legislative info, while the governments they are supposed to supervise and scrutinise go into perpetual deficit spending (right chart, not just USA, but in all developed world). The main side effect of this is the explosive increase in tax burden - big governments need big tax incomes to finance - while killing the middle class (note how little regulation there was before WW2):

There are many such charts that demonstrate such post-WW2 cancerous growth of the administrative state, but we will stop at the above three. 

No wonder so many democracies now look like autocracies (see our many UK comments for details), with the state and its establishment allies increasingly targeting real representatives the people voted in as 'deplorables', 'extreme right wing', and 'populists'. That cycle seems to have reversed: now people are voting en masse against the socialist establishment, and bringing back to power, one after another, politicians who vow to fight for the common man,  and not globalist causes:

Note how this movement has turned from a trickle from 2019 into a tsunami by 2025. The momentum of the counter establishment movement was gaining so much speed that the powers that be had to persecute Trump with endless lawfare, put Le Pen in jail to prevent her returning to power in 2007, and disqualify Călin Georgescu so his anti-EU policies will never see the day of light... It has now reached such farcical extent that Germany's spy agency labelled AfD 'extremist entity' to ban the now most popular political force:

This wave of anti-establishment sentiment is reaching a new height in May in the UK, where local elections returned a landslide win by Nigel Farage's Reform party, decimating all other opposition in the process.

Milei - the more daring (or genuine) of the rebels

It is against this context that we view President Milei as a phenomenon that will not vanish overnight, because he is a fresh outsider with policies far more radical than many of the more jaded politicians named in the table above - most of whom having been in politics for far too long, and have become disillusioned by the bureaucratic drag that they know will undermine their policies.

Milei is different - he seems unmotivated by money and position, and he is a more fervent believer of anarcho-capitalism than just about all the rebels listed above (see analysis here for a good summary of his beliefs). What's more, he does not mince his words:

Another example (see link here) of his no holds barred style makes him so transparent to the voters as to where he stands, unlike all politicians out there:

This is why his public spending cut drives (see this video for dramatic effect), although ambitious, could indeed work?

Will Milei succeed?

The biggest question on the minds of investors will be: does Milei have the ability to pull off his reform agenda, not being the leader of a majority party in the parliament? Here is our quick take on his various policy agenda thus far:

? = to be seen, ⍻ = partial success

One year in, we are delighted to see so many ticks or half ticks in this long list of dramatic social/economic/political reforms in the sick man of America a.k.a. Argentina. So impressed is the current reformist US to have such an ally that the Trump administration seems willing to help Milei with Argentina's debt restructuring efforts (link).

His latest big surgery is to return the Peso to market driven fair values, and is apparently succeeding - below, the black market rate premium (blue area below) has collapsed from 160% pre-Milei to near parity now:

The only previous episode when we had a similar drop was during the term of President Mauricio Macri (2015) when he lifted capital controls. The premium returned after President Alberto Fernández was elected and reinstated strict currency controls (which gave rise to property hoarding as a hedge of hyperinflation that resulted). 

If we were to bet on a new future for Argentina, we need Milei and his policies to stick, at least for a typical 3-5 year minimum investment horizon for properties.

Can Milei be re-elected?

This leads naturally to the next questions - is he still popular? What are his chances of being re-elected?

First on popularity: it is heartening to see him almost as popular now as the day he stormed to power 1.5 years ago - standing at 47% support now vs 49% back in Jan 2024:

It is interesting to see that President Macri, being pro-market as well, had similar popularity levels as Milei, although starting off with much higher popularity than Milei. Across all income strata, it seems the people who support Milei most are the lower middle class and the poorest segments of the society:

And compared to all other heads of states in South America, Milei has the most constant net approval ratings, whilst fellow presidents generally suffering from rising net negative approval ratings:

So the proof of the pudding will be first the Buenos Aires election on 18th May (yes this week!), followed by the national election on 26th October (see here).

Given the widespread anti-establishment uprising around the globe described above, even the Buenos Aires election is seeing new party being formed by the former mayor (like Reform in the UK?).

If one believes in the saying 'the trend is your friend', we probably have a very high chance of free market politicians winning again in Argentina as well...