20130913 新城財經台《香樹輝King King 傾》- 土地供應及郊野公園

以下是2013年9月13日之節目錄音：

王震宇認為郊野公園屬重要資產不應發展住宅

13/9/2013 12:09

地產分析員王震宇出席本台節目後表示, 相比其它競爭對手, 例如新加坡 , 本港郊野公園面積雖然較多 , 但認為這屬於重要資產, 不應用作發展住宅 .
 

他又指, 現時本港有六成七用地為非郊野公園綠化帶 , 相信當中兩成土地可以研究改變用途 . 他認為, 特區政府可以仿效澳門, 租用內地土地 , 或是跟中央政府商討在深圳鄰近地區, 設立「特區中的特區」 , 以解決本港土地供應問題.
 

另外王震宇指表示, 過去十年 , 本港丁屋及工業用地各增加三成, 但土地儲備卻下跌四成, 批評政府過去推出土地規劃錯誤 , 建議政府將公營房屋用地轉為私人房屋, 又將地皮拆細推出 , 增加中小型發展商競爭, 同時放寬【編按：收緊】中下階層市民置業時的按揭成數.

王震宇認為美國退市對資金流動性影響短暫

13/9/2013 11:49

地產分析員王震宇出席本台節目後表示, 現時美國經濟復甦步伐並非強勁 , 加上美國負債仍然高企, 以及美元持續上升, 相信會影響當地出口 , 認為即使聯儲局退市對資金流動性影響屬短暫.
 

他又表示, 現時本港樓市受政府的政策影響 , 難以估計樓價短期表現, 若撇除政策因素, 由於環球經濟復甦, 本港進出口行業受惠, 相信本港明年經濟增長會為百分之四至五, 認為市民有能力應付租金, 在各項經濟因素向好下 , 王震宇認為美國退市, 對本港樓價都不會有太大影響 , 即使聯儲局加息50至100點子 , 樓價仍會有支持.

 

20130218 SCMP article - Quantitative Squeezing

below is the original text before being modified for publication in the SCMP. But I liked my original passage more, so here it is:

Bull view: quantitative squeezing

There has been a lot of talk of a housing market bubble in Hong Kong and that interest rate rises may precipitate a price collapse soon. I argue otherwise. Here are three reasons why.

We live in a time of high inflation and low interest rates. The world is awash with cash thanks to the money-printing programmes of the world’s biggest central banks (Japan, the US, the euro zone), and even some emerging %market countries).

First, superior returns. Compared to “safe” or investment grade instruments from deposits to government bonds, which are generating negative real returns – that is, real yields of -2.5 to -3.5% – real property yields although also negative, are a more palatable 0% to -1.5%. This also explains why Hongkongers have been buying high-yield bonds and, more recently, equities. These can generate returns above inflation. However, they have higher corporate, credit, and supply risks, whereas property does not suffer any of these drawbacks.

Second, inflation hedging. Property is also a great hedge on inflation, which is the big bogeyman lurking on the periphery, thanks to unprecedented and radical use of quantitative easing by global central banks. While rental income rises alongside inflation (as any leaseholder knows), a 10-year bond issued today with a one per cent coupon will yield that same one per cent for the next 10 years.

Third, governments’ need to hold rates down. With global central banks in a “race to debase”, money supply growth should continue to run high in the double digits. If the free market were to determine interest rates, fast depreciating currencies would lead to sky-high interest rates to compensate for the risk of lost purchasing power. However, central banks will hold down interest rates down near zero in order to boost growth.

So what about the prospect of rising interest rates, given Hong Kong housing prices are highly sensitive to interest-rate rises? My conclusion is: barring hyper-inflation, central banks will not hike rates for another 3-4 years. Excepting a handful of oil producer countries, all governments worldwide are running on large and structural budget deficits, with the developed countries seeing their debt burden approaching or exceeding 100% of GDP. If the USA GDP growth is already at an anemic 2%, a two percentage point rate hike will wipe out all growth, and put politicians out of their jobs. Now, if you are the head of state of any of the advanced economies, will you let interest rates go up?

Hong Kong property will fall, but only after another 20 per cent-plus rise has kicked in over the next few years.

20130104 新城財經台 - 香樹輝 King King傾

20130104 新城財經台 - 香樹輝 King King傾

以下是2013年1月4日之節目錄音：

Metro Radio - Heung Shu Fai 20130104

王震宇料樓價首季微跌後全年將升一成

Bricks and Mortar分析員王震宇出席本台節目後表示, 政府去年十月底推出的兩項遏抑樓市措施後, 雖然樓市成交明顯下跌 , 但措施較政府兩年多前首次推出額外印花稅時為低 . 他指今次政府出招, 只是擊退外來買家 , 但樓價無明顯回落, 亦都不見有大量投資者急於沽貨離場.

王震宇估計今年首季樓價會輕微回落, 但相信由於市民普遍在新一年獲加薪 , 將會帶動樓價在農曆新年後反彈 . 他又認為在各國維持寬鬆政策的大環境下 , 資金會流向實體資產和商品 , 估計今年樓價會升一成.

王震宇又指特區政府正處於弱勢, 要透過壓低樓價增加支持度. 他說政府原意是好 , 但執行上來卻適得其反. 他認為月中的施政報告和下月的財政預算案, 都不應該再推出調控樓市措施 . 他說未來一兩年住宅新供應每年只有大約1萬 2千個單位, 遠遠追不上每年 4萬個單位的市場需求 , 認為應該政府增加土地供應.

20121219 為何法定貨幣計價名義增長是誤導？

【下文為早前同題文章由信報中譯之版本，原文可於本網誌查閱】

2012年12月19日 王震宇 宇論

為何法定貨幣計價名義增長是誤導？

你是否知道，2010年英國普通工人每年收入23000鎊，較2007年危機前的收入增加了6%？基於英國經濟在此期間經歷了全球金融危機，這看來是個很好的成績。但若我們以實質角度觀察，工人的收入實際較前惡化了約2%。

英國收入過去一世紀增了330番
回顧更久遠的時間，例如十年、二十年、五十年，甚至一百年，收入增加得更多，分別是42%、120%、4200%，甚至是33000%。但與2000年、1990年、1960年，或1910年比較，英國工人在財政上是否真的更好？

回答這個問題的其中一個方法，是以實質角度觀察，那分別是8%、25%、140%和316%的升幅，顯示人們的收入在這些時段確有改善。然而，按年率計算，這些收益會分別大幅縮減至0.8%、1.1%、1.8%及1.1%，而增長的速度在過去五十年亦已放緩。

過去多個世紀的增長
在有收入數據可查的期間（1209至2010年）有七個可識別的趨勢，可以用不同的社會、政治及經濟因素以作解釋。

1. 直至十四世紀初葉的增長持續下降—原因是中世紀的人口過剩、土地短缺和土質貧化。

2. 在1310年至1380年間的快速增長—很可能是因為1315年的大饑荒和1348年的鼠疫導致大量人口死亡，令工資被推高。

3. 1380年至1509年間的緩慢增長—似受議會限制工資及物價上升壓力的努力，以及中世紀後期經濟復蘇開始發揮作用的影響。

4. 1500年至1600年的收入下跌—極像十四世紀期間人口大幅下降因而導致工人短缺及推高薪酬的情況，十六世紀的人口急升意味工資下跌，並因世紀中期的急速通脹而更加惡化。

5. 1600年至1800年的重新回復增長—正值英國殖民帝國及東印度公司的發展初期，二者均帶來更多的經濟活動和財富返國。

6. 1800年至1945年的高增長率「後工業」趨勢—似乎源於通過《聯合憲法》後政治更趨穩定，經濟從工業革命中獲益，以及國際貿易得到擴展。

7. 最後是自二次世界大戰結束以來（1945年起），我們獲得史上最快速的收入增長趨勢—我們會在下邊討論這個時期。

正如【圖1】所示，英國的實質平均收入停留在指數式增長路徑內，特別自1800年代開始加快速度（圖1中綠色虛線）。但除非有無限的資源（以及無限的新市場以賺取更多的收入），否則增長必將放緩。自2008年以來的實質收入下降不是短暫現象，而是較大趨勢的一部份（查看【圖2】的趨勢線），那是否意味標誌英國過去數世紀繁榮的高速增長路徑正開始改變航向？

名義增長屬心理改善
上圖顯示實質收入趨勢。然而，收入（或生活水平）的實質下跌被名義數字所掩蓋。反映這個情況的近期最佳例子是第一和第二次世界大戰。在一戰期間，實質收入從5957跌至5047（截至1919年 下跌15%），在同一時期，名義收入則從80上升了67%至133【圖3】。名義與實質數字之間的割斷亦可在二戰期間見到，當時的實質收入從8214跌至 7195（截至1945年下跌12%），與此同時，名義收入則從170上升了26%至214。

政府稀釋其貨幣價值的嘗試一直存在，而隨着落實政策承諾遭遇困難，有關嘗試只會變得更加強烈。當紙幣在國際交易中變更普遍時，完全貶值的嘗試亦發展至高峰。

雖然英國1931年脫離金本位是基於多重原因，例如英國出口競爭力下降、失業率上升壓力，以及1929年全球衰退的餘震，但這個轉變肯定有助推高名義收入增長，從0.46%的長期平均增長率（圖3中的藍色虛線）升至5.66%的新「範式」（圖3中的綠色虛線）。

雖然年復年地交出名義增長或者曾令人感覺良好，但各國政府卻可能於脫離金本位時才初嘗增長藥劑，並一食上癮—1931年的行動讓我們首次決定性地脫離數百年來的趨勢。（【圖4】中，由藍色虛線移向更陡斜的綠色虛線）

按實際貨幣量度收入
更令人憂慮的是，若當時沒有格林斯平ZIRP（零利率政策）刺激的最嚴重過剩，把全球資產泡沫推向頂峰，1988年英國樓市爆破的威力本會更深（但長遠來 說，較健康）。英國於1990年代及2000年代初再享受了幾年較高增長，但隨之而來的「殘留物」卻要更長時間治癒，很可能的結果是收入需要一段長時間由基本因素、而非信貸/流動資金/槓桿推動的增長。就算假設英國收入增長能以數百年來的0.46%平均增長率（圖4中的紫線）於1931年後趨勢區間內谷底回升，亦將要直至2013年（走向趨勢中點），以至更差的2027年（走向趨勢底部），現時的調整才可完成。

英國脫離金本位、迎來「法定貨幣新時代」前，收入無論以黃金抑或以政府支撐的紙幣計算，均有幾乎相同的購買力（【圖5】中兩條近乎平衡的虛線）。不過，這個關係在20世紀期間破碎。

雖然黃金的購買力踏入20世紀時仍能跟隨它的長期趨勢，以法定貨幣計算的「增長」卻達到拋物線般起飛。這是否可代表英國（就經濟活動而言）的創造力、發明才能、生產力本質上沒有改變（以黃金計算）？

英鎊購買力自脫離金本位後加速貶值，其實亦可見於它在我們的研究中其實過了近700年才失去首90%的購買力。相較下，接着兩次購買下跌90%時均發生在1950年後，而且每次只需要短得多的30年左右【圖6】。

 註：上圖之'9%'應作'90%'

上述的討論顯示，如果世界各地政府成功維持這種名義經濟快速增長的表面狀況，人們的福祉或生活水準未必真的會提升。另一方面，由名義增長推動的經濟策略的風險，伴隨着政府介入愈來愈多資產類別，將令全球經濟更不平衡。

To earn one’s keep – why is fiat currency deonominated nominal growth misleading?

UK earnings have grown 330-fold over the past century

Did you know that in 2010 the average UK worker earned £23,000 a year, 6% above pre-crisis 2007 earnings? This may seem a good outcome given that the country’s economy weathered through a global financial crisis during that period. But, if we look at this in real terms, workers are actually worse off by around 2%.

Looking back further, over 10, 20, 50, even 100 years, earnings are up even higher – 42%, 120%, 4,200%, and even 33,000% respectively. But are British workers genuinely better off financially compared to the years 2000, 1990, 1960, or 1910? One way to answer this question is to look at earnings in real terms, which at 8%, 25%, 140%, and 316% respectively indicate some genuine improvements in people’s income over these periods. However, on an annualised basis, these gains become much reduced at 0.8%, 1.1%, 1.8%, and 1.1% respectively, with the pace of growth also having slowed over the past 50 years.

Explaining growth over the centuries

During the period for which earnings[1] data is available (1209-2010) there are seven identifiable sub-trends, which can be explained by various social, political, and economic factors [heading numbers below correspond to arrow labels in Figure 1].

1)   Growth declined up until around the turn of the 14^th century – due to medieval over-population, land shortages and depleted soils

2)   A fast growth period between 1310 and 1380 – possibly due to the large loss of lives from the Great Famine of 1315 and the Black Death of 1348, driving up wages

3)  Slowing growth between 1380 and 1509 – likely due to the efforts of parliament to curtail upward pressures on wages and prices, as well as the effects of the late medieval economic recovery coming into play

4) Falling earnings between 1500 and 1600 – Much like how the large drops in population and subsequent shortages of workers had pushed up wages during the 14^th century, the rapid rise of population in 16^th century meant that wages fell. This was worsened by rapid inflation around the middle of the century.

5) Growth resumed between 1600 and 1800 – coinciding with the early beginnings of the English colonial empire and the East India Company – both of which brought about greater economic activities and wealth repatriation

6)  Post-industrial trend with elevated growth rates between 1800 and 1945 – likely caused by greater political stability following the Acts of Union, the economic benefits of the Industrial Revolution as well as expanded international trade

7)  Finally we have the fastest earnings growth trend in history since the end of WW2 (1945 onwards) – we will discuss this period below

Figure 1 – Average Annual Real Earnings (in 2010 £s)

 

As shown by the chart above, the UK’s average real earnings have remained on an exponential growth path, with an especially accelerated pace since 1800s [green dotted lines in Figure 1]. But unless there are unlimited resources (and unlimited new markets to earn ever bigger incomes), this growth will have to slow down. If the drops in real earnings since 2008 were not a blip but part of a larger trend [see trend line in Figure 2], could the stellar growth path that has marked the UK’s prosperity over the past few centuries be beginning to change course?

Figure 2 – Real Earnings Growth since 1950 (Entering negative territory?)

Nominal growth provides only a psychological sense of improvement

The above charts showed real earnings trends. However, real drops in earnings (or living standards) are masked by nominal figures. The best recent examples of this are the First and Second World Wars. During WWI, real earnings fell from 5,957 to 5,047 (down 15% by 1918) [Figure 1] whereas over the same period, nominal earnings went up 67% from 80 to 133 [Figure 3]. The same disconnect between nominal and real figures can also be seen during WWII, during which real earnings fell from 8,214 to 7,195 (down 12% by 1945) [Figure 1]. Meanwhile, nominal earnings went up 26% from 170 to 214 [Figure 3].

The temptation has always existed for governments to dilute the values of their currencies, and with difficulties in delivering all policy promises, this temptation only ever grows stronger. As paper currency became more widespread in international transactions, the temptation to depreciate competitively has also grown to its highest.

While the UK’s departure from the Gold Standard in 1931 was due to multiple factors such as a fall in the competitiveness of British exports, the pressures of growing unemployment, as well as aftershocks from the global recession of 1929, the change certainly helped boost nominal earnings growth from a long term average growth rate of 0.46% [blue dotted in in Figure 3] to a new ‘paradigm’ of 5.66% [green dotted line in Figure 3].

Figure 3 – Average Annual Nominal Earnings

Towards the slow end of the S-growth curve

Though it may have felt good to keep delivering nominal growth year in year out, the departure from the Gold Standard might have become the first injection of the growth drug that gets governments hooked – the 1931 move gave us the first decisive departure from the centuries-old trend [a move from the blue dotted line to the steeper green dotted line in Figure 4]. 

Figure 4 – Average Annual Real Earnings (in 2010 £s)

In 1971, the USA also joined in the wild party of ‘currency depreciation and global credit expansion’. This helped the UK achieve a second burst of even more rapid nominal growth [orange dotted line in Figure 4] that lasted until the UK property bubble finally burst in 1988 [black dotted line in Figure 4].

What is more worrying is that the 1988 popping of the UK property market could have been deeper (but in the longer term, healthier) if the biggest excesses, driven by Mr Greenspan’s ZIRP (Zero Interest Rate Policy) had not pushed the global asset bubble to its peak. The UK enjoyed a few more years of higher growth in the 90s and early 2000s, but the hangover that followed will take much longer to heal, with a likely consequence that a prolonged period of fundamentals driven, rather than credit/liquidity/leverage propelled growth will be needed. Even assuming UK earnings growth bottoms out within the post-1931 trend channel, at the centuries long 0.46% growth rate [purple line in Figure 4] it will be 2013 (to trend mid-point) or worse, 2027 (to the bottom of the trend channel) before the current correction is complete [see Nominal growth chart in Figure 3].

Measuring earnings with real money

Before the ‘new era of fiat money’, marked by the UK’s departure from the Gold Standard, earnings as measured by gold and by government-backed paper money had almost identical purchasing powers [see the two near-parallel dotted lines in Figure 5]. However, this relationship broke down during the 20^th century.

Whereas the purchasing power of gold has continued along its long term trend even into the 20^th century [purple dotted line, which is parallel to the prior blue dotted line, Figure 5], the ‘growth’ as measured by flat money has grown to parabolic heights. Could this signify that British ingenuity, inventiveness and productivity (as far as economic activities are concerned) has not fundamentally changed (as measured by gold), but that the boom represented by the nominal line [as measured by fiat currency, orange dotted line, Figure 5] had created a far more positive picture than reality? Is it possible to draw the conclusion that the invention of the internet had no more powerful an impact on the British earnings power than the discovery of the new world?

Figure 5 – Earnings index (in ounces of gold) vs. Earnings index (in nominal £s)

The accelerated erosion of the Pound’s purchasing power since the departure from Gold Standard is also illustrated by the fact that it took nearly 700 years for the currency’s purchasing power to fall by its first 90% in the period under our study. In comparison, the next two 90% drops in purchasing power both took place after 1950 and only took drastically shorter periods of around 30 years each! [Figure 6]

Figure 6 – Drops in GBP purchasing power (Indexed currency depreciation)

Conclusion and outlook

What the above discussion shows is that if the world’s governments succeed in maintaining this façade of fast nominal economic growth, people may not enjoy real increases in their welfare or standards of living. On the other hand, the risks of such a nominal growth driven economic strategy, with ever greater government intervention in increasing number of asset classes, imbalances in the global economy will only increase.

It might be that we will not only succeed in avoiding nominal economic growth slowdown as governments planned [blue arrow in Figure 7], but overshoot wildly beyond what is already a near vertical growth path, leading people to lose confidence in the currency altogether. So instead of the more painful red line (at the previously discussed historic level of 0.46% growth), we might see breakdowns in the status quo of economic policy making.

One of the possible consequences of a complete loss in confidence would be Zimbabwe-style hyperinflation [green arrow in Figure 7]. The line between deflation (which governments are fighting in the Western world) and hyperinflation (should their policies fail) could be very thin indeed.

Figure 7 – Nominal Earnings growth entered an exponential path in 20^th century

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[1] ‘Average earnings’ has a broader meaning than just wages, and includes other forms of compensation (from payments, bonuses and commissions to overtime supplements). ‘Real earnings’ are adjusted for inflation in 2010 pound term).

This article was researched and written with significant input from Charles Appleton, whose contribution is greatly appreciated.